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CONTENT:

Note from the Editor in Chief	
Huseyn Baghirov	4
THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF DHIMMIS IN MODERN OTTOMAN HISTORY	
Ulvu Rahimli.....	5
RELIGIOUS PROCESSES IN SOUTH AZERBAIJAN IN THE 1940S: BASED ON THE MATERIALS OF THE “AZERBAIJAN” NEWSPAPER (1947-1949)	
Ali Farhadov.....	14
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION (2+4 NEGOTIATIONS) AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY	
Javid Mammadli.....	27
THE MISSION OF CONSTANTINE PATRIKIOS TO THE KARTVELIAN KINGDOM – DIPLOMATIC SCANDAL AROUND ARTANUJI FORTRESS	
Lali Mekerishvili.....	34
THE CONCEPT OF MULTILATERALISM IN CANADA' FOREIGN POLICY	
Luka Jintcharadze	41
TOPOONYM OF KEPAZ (HARAK) MOUNTAIN IN AZERBAIJANI POETRY	
Zakiyya Abilova.....	49
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES.....	57

Note from the Editor in Chief

We are happy to inform everyone who pursues to publish their research papers, written in an impartial manner and analyzes the historical past without political bias.

Reconstructing the Past: Journal of Historical Studies aims to foster recovering historical past without fear or favor, based not only on the historical methods and methodology, but also on an interdisciplinary approach.

Our purpose is to provide a forum for scientific research without political overtones.

Kind regards,

Professor Huseyn Baghirov

Founder of the Western Caspian University

THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF DHIMMIS IN MODERN OTTOMAN HISTORY

Ulvu Rahimli*

ABSTRACT

In the multi-ethnic structure of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish-Muslim population was predominantly employed in military and bureaucratic positions, while non-Muslim subjects played an active role in nearly all areas of commerce. Among them, Armenians, Greeks, and Jews held particularly privileged positions. These communities were not only prominent in domestic trade but also played a leading role in the empire's commercial relations with foreign countries. As a result, legal changes concerning dhimmis (non-Muslim subjects) emerged during the modern period of the Ottoman Empire. During the reform era that began in the 19th century, non-Muslims benefited the most from reforms related to the commercial sector.

Keywords: Dhimmis, Ottoman Commercial Law, Legal Status of Minorities, Tanzimat Reforms, Economic Integration in the Ottoman Empire.

INTRODUCTION

The Ottoman Empire, which spanned a vast geographical area, provided significant opportunities for the development of trade. The long-standing trade networks of Anatolia, the Middle East, and the Balkans continued to expand during the Ottoman period. The Ottoman administration allowed non-Muslim communities—who had lived on these lands for centuries—to lead many of these commercial relations.

This study, which consists of two main sections, explores the roles and legal status of the non-Muslim subjects (*dhimmis*) in the field of commerce within the Ottoman Empire. The first part focuses on the three main non-Muslim communities active in trade—Armenians, Greeks, and Jews—and examines the commercial relations they engaged in and the roles they assumed. The second part of the first section discusses the Ottoman Empire's commercial relations with foreign countries and highlights how *dhimmis* played a significant role in these interactions.

The second main section of the study, which forms the core of this research, clarifies the legal rights of *dhimmis* in the Ottoman Empire regarding trade and how these rights evolved chronologically.

The aim of this study is to investigate the commercial law of non-Muslim communities living in the Ottoman Empire from a historical perspective. For this purpose, it examines how trade law developed during the modern period of the empire and how non-Muslims benefited from these legal reforms. In the course of the research, both historical and legal academic sources have been utilized.

This study argues that the legal status of non-Muslim communities (*dhimmis*) in the Ottoman Empire was not merely a religious classification but served as a key structural element shaping their economic participation. By analyzing the legal and institutional frameworks of the Ottoman system—particularly during the Tanzimat and Reform eras—the article explores how *dhimmis*, especially Jews, Armenians, and Greeks, navigated and benefited from these evolving legal environments in trade and property ownership.

1. Commercial Sectors in Which Dhimmis Were Active in the Ottoman Empire

During the classical period, various measures such as supporting East-West trade, keeping the Black Sea closed to foreign merchants, controlling major overland trade routes between Asia and Europe, and ensuring the protection of urban centers enhanced the importance of commercial activities.

In its founding period, the Ottoman Empire aimed to maintain the ongoing economic development in Anatolia and followed an economic policy in this direction. Therefore, it did not

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obstruct the activities of foreign merchants. With the conquest of the Middle East and the Balkans, the empire gained a significant commercial position in global trade—especially in Asia-Europe commerce—and took control over major trade routes. Aware of the significance of this trade, the state built roadside inns (caravanserais) and ensured the security of transportation routes.

However, since the primary founding element of the state, the Muslim Turks, were largely engaged in governance and military affairs, they neglected economic activities. This gap was filled by dhimmis (non-Muslims) and foreigners. In order to both encourage foreigners and revive trade—and as a demonstration of the empire's strength—certain commercial privileges were granted under the name capitulations (trade agreements) (Ayyıldız, 2017, p. 591; Şenel, n.d.).

Following the conquest of Istanbul, one of the most significant changes was the replacement of the Italians, who had lost their dominance, by non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, particularly Armenians, Jews, and Greeks. Unlike in the pre-Ottoman period, when the Genoese largely excluded local populations from overseas commerce, after the conquest both Kaffa and Galata saw Greeks taking over the large-scale commercial roles previously held by the Italians (Köse, 2001, p. 234).

As a result, dhimmi merchants such as Armenians, Greeks, Jews, along with Arabs, played key roles in trade. However, the central government was careful to prevent any one group from becoming too dominant and took precautions accordingly. In addition to non-Muslims and foreigners, the Turkish-Muslim population also participated in domestic and international trade. Indeed, in commercial hubs such as Bursa, companies established by Turkish merchants engaged in foreign trade were known to exist. Some Turkish merchants were even active in foreign countries (Şenel, n.d.).

Armenians:

The esnaf (guild) registers indicate that dhimmis were included in the same guild structures as Muslims. In these registers, Muslims were listed first, followed by Christians, and finally Jews. Due to their knowledge of foreign languages, dhimmis gained advantageous positions in both commerce and public service. Professions such as goldsmithing, money changing, banking, and architecture were predominantly carried out by dhimmis within the empire.

For example, an examination of the sharia court records of Bolu during the reign of Mahmud II reveals that a significant portion of the non-Muslim population there consisted of Armenians, who were engaged in a wide variety of professions. Commercial activities such as goldsmithing, money changing, timber trade, peddling, and coffeehouse management were generally dominated by the Armenian population.

Additionally, the Polish traveler Simeon, who visited Bolu in 1613, noted that Armenians in the city were also engaged in dyeing and kaftan-making (Demirağ, 2002, p. 20). Furthermore, Armenians were more likely than Greeks to speak Turkish in their homes, which enabled them to establish smoother business relations with the Turks.

By the last quarter of the 19th century, in parallel with their rising influence within the empire, Armenians also began establishing connections with the outside world. These connections extended beyond Europe and Russia to include Iran and India (İlgen, 2007, p. 102).

Greeks:

It is understood that the Greek population played a particularly important role in the integration of their regions into the global market. Leveraging both their external networks and their influence within the region, Greeks succeeded in dominating every aspect of trade—from large-scale international commerce to medium-sized regional trade, from retail in small urban shops to wholesale trade.

Greek merchants expanded their influence in nearly every sector, from textiles to figs, raisins, olive oil, and liqueurs, and competed with both Armenians and British merchants in these fields. By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Greek merchants are reported to have controlled approximately 40% to 50% of the Ottoman Empire's trade with Western countries—an indication of the extent of their economic impact (İlgen, 2007, pp. 101–102).

Jews:

Starting from the 16th century, the increase in the Jewish population in Bursa led to a revitalization of economic life. Thanks to their talents in economics and bureaucracy, Jews enjoyed significant

opportunities. As a result of Jewish migration to Bursa, economic competition intensified between local Jews and new arrivals. Court records also indicate that rental agreements made by Jews in Bursa contributed to the vibrancy of the local economy. The lack of professional restrictions on Jews also played an important role in their contribution to commercial life (Sercan, n.d.).

The professions and business sectors of Jews living in Bursa covered a wide range. Jews were generally involved in law, guardianship, woolen cloth trade, tax farming, jewelry, mining, and also engaged in the trade of leather, rice, fish, dye, wool, silk, wine, marble, grapes, and raisins. Particularly in transferring goods from east to west, Jews often took on transportation roles. During the 16th century, Jewish commercial activity in Bursa was especially concentrated in the silk trade. Their involvement in trade also became a major source of income, and Jews were known for their wealth in the city (Sercan, n.d.).

From the mid-19th century, Jews became the most economically dominant group in Thessaloniki, working as commission agents or retail traders. They exported grain, tobacco, and oil, while importing coffee, sugar, and oil. Their main source of income was the grain trade. From the 1870s until the Balkan Wars, Jews also dominated industries such as cotton, flour, and brick production. Meanwhile, Greeks continued in retail trade, and there were also Franks, who mostly traded with Western Europe. The most prominent industries in Thessaloniki included thread, weaving, flour, tile, brick, soap, tobacco, and cigarette production (Yıldız, 2012, p. 40).

By the 1830s, non-Muslim merchants dominated commercial activity in all major cities of the empire. Exemptions and protections granted through commercial agreements positioned minorities not only as intermediaries between Ottoman producers and European capitalists until the end of the 19th century but also as conduits for European financial capital within the empire. By the century's end, not a single Muslim-Turk was listed among Istanbul's prominent bankers. Among the forty major bankers: 12 were Greeks, 12 Armenians, 8 Jews, and 5 Levantines. The capital-driven Istanbul financial market was monopolized by minorities: 18 of the 34 leading moneylenders were Greeks, 6 were Jews, and 5 were Armenians. In the Balkans, financial markets were under Greek dominance.

During the Tanzimat period, industries aimed at fulfilling daily needs developed in cities like Istanbul, Bursa, Tokat, and Baghdad, producing items such as plows, iron, steel pipes, locks, knives, small steam engines, gunpowder, and carpets. However, these industrial facilities were often directly managed by minorities or their advisory positions were occupied by non-Muslim subjects. Toward the late 19th century, half of the businesses with five or more employees were owned by Greeks, while the combined share of Armenian, Jewish, and foreign-owned enterprises reached 35%. Turkish-owned businesses accounted for only 15%, ranking just after Armenian firms. British financial expansion in the Ottoman Empire also relied on non-Muslim networks. In 19th-century Egypt, many European banks were under Greek control. Prior to the Greek dominance of Ottoman commercial and financial relations in the late 19th century, Jews had played a central role in Anatolia's urban artisanry, farming, shopkeeping, money changing, and lending. Up to the 18th century in Istanbul, doctors, diplomats, and bankers in public service were primarily Jewish, and Jewish merchants also dominated long-distance trade with European markets (Köse, 2001, p. 230).

1.1. Trade Relations with Christian Countries

England

Initially, trade between England and the Ottoman Empire was controlled directly by English merchants. However, over time, this trade underwent a significant transformation. Following the dissolution of the Levant Company in 1825[†], the English monopoly over Eastern Mediterranean commerce was lifted. As a result, British merchants in the Ottoman Empire began founding family-owned trading houses to fill the void, which quickly spread across the region.

During this period, European merchants increasingly collaborated with local intermediaries, whose importance and influence grew. Trade with the Ottoman interior came to rely largely on Greek,

[†] For detailed information, see: <https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/news-wires-white-papers-and-books/levant-compan>

Armenian, and Jewish commission agents. The higher educational level, work ethic, business experience and skills, familiarity with Turkish customs and language, and fluency in European languages made these local non-Muslim intermediaries indispensable to European merchants. Small-scale commerce, manufacturing, money lending, and coastal trade were almost entirely in their hands. Acting as local retailers, they sold imported goods and provided valuable feedback to European traders about local consumer preferences.

Many of these intermediaries, who initially acted as market guides, later established their own trading houses. They began to import European goods independently and even export Ottoman goods directly to Europe. Some opened branches or representatives not only in Istanbul and Izmir, but also in various European commercial centers. In particular, Greek and Armenian trading houses became widespread in England (Baskıcı, 2009, pp. 43–44).

The 1838 Treaty of Balta Liman reorganized customs tariffs between the two countries. Before the treaty, export and import duties were set at 3%, and internal transport taxes were around 8%. Following the treaty, export duties were raised to 12%, while import duties were reduced to 5%.

In reality, the agreement exposed the economic asymmetry between England and the Ottoman Empire. While England exported high-profit items to the empire, including cotton and woolen textiles, hardware goods, fine clocks, sugar, tin, iron, and coal, the Ottomans mainly exported processed wool and silk, grains, and opium. Despite this trade imbalance, and although most European countries—including England—maintained high tariff walls and state monopolies on products such as tobacco, salt, and snuff, the Ottoman Empire was forced to unilaterally lower its own tariffs without demanding reciprocal concessions. This disproportionately benefited Greek merchants, who quickly began to purchase capitulations and berats (official protections) from foreign embassies. As a result, the non-Muslim subjects of the empire rapidly accumulated wealth and strengthened their economic position within the Ottoman realm (Basan, 2009, pp. 49, 61).

Russia

From the 15th century onwards, Russian merchants were observed operating within the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Belgrade (1739) granted Russian traders the right to conduct commercial activities throughout Ottoman waters and territories—excluding the Black Sea. However, the treaty explicitly prohibited Russian military and commercial ships in the Sea of Azov and Black Sea. Utilizing these commercial privileges, Russia began to secure important opportunities to achieve its longstanding objective of accessing warm-water ports in the second half of the 18th century.

The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) marked a significant turning point in Ottoman–Russian relations. One of its crucial outcomes was Russia's official designation as the protector of Orthodox Christians within the empire. To exercise this protectorate role effectively, Russia required a legal framework to operate within Ottoman territories. Therefore, Russian consulates were established and extensively utilized under the pretext of supporting commerce and commercial activity (Erdönmez, 2019, pp. 140–141).

The Treaty of Aynalıkavak, signed on 21 March 1799, included a key article (Article 6) outlining commercial regulations between the two states. Upon the implementation of this and related treaties, Russia established consulates not only in the Balkans, but also in Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean port cities and islands, including Cyprus.

In Cyprus, in addition to the dominant powers of Britain, Russia, and France, consular representatives from Greece, Sweden, and Denmark also intervened in local internal affairs. Although the primary function of these consuls was to oversee the commercial activities of their nationals, the issues they caused often extended beyond commerce into legal affairs. The broad interpretation of legal privileges provided the technical justification for such interventions, while the actual motivation stemmed from the Ottoman Empire's vulnerable international and domestic political circumstances.

In practice, Russian consuls in Cyprus regularly interfered in internal affairs under the pretense of supporting their merchants. These interventions included attempts to influence customs tariffs and taxation, creating conflict among local tax farmers, establishing close ties with local

officials, filing complaints to Istanbul, and even challenging the basic principles of Islamic law. The issues arising from the Russian consulates' activities in mid-19th-century Cyprus were, in fact, a direct consequence of Russia's wider commercial ambitions on the island (Erdönmez, 2019, pp. 141, 144).

Between 1830 and 1902, exports from the Ottoman Empire to England and France showed a steady increase, while Austria and Russia's shares in Ottoman exports generally declined, except for a few years. As highly industrialized nations, England and France had a greater demand for Ottoman raw materials, and as such, benefited from trade agreements and global economic conditions.

Looking at total exports, the average annual figure rose from £3.8 million (1830–1832) to £20.3 million (1900–1902)—a 5.3-fold increase over 72 years. Notably, Britain's share of Ottoman exports grew considerably after the trade agreement in 1840, while Austria's share consistently declined. In general, industrialized countries obtained increasing and variable proportions of Ottoman exports (Avdar & Avdar, 2020, p. 117).

Following the establishment of the Ministry of Trade in 1839, matters concerning European merchants began to be handled by this institution. Previously managed by the *beylikçi* (imperial secretary), these responsibilities were now assumed by the Minister of Trade. Thus, becoming a registered merchant (*defterli tüccar*) was only possible through a formal submission (*arz*) made by the Minister upon the recommendation of other merchants. A Trade Council affiliated with the Ministry was established shortly thereafter, and by 1850, a Commercial Court (*Ticaret Mahkemesi*) had been formed. From then on, legal disputes involving European merchants pertaining to commerce were adjudicated within this new institutional framework. Following the foundation of the Commercial Court, imperial decrees clarified jurisdictional boundaries to prevent administrative inconsistencies. Accordingly, commercial cases were to be heard in the Commercial Court, religious matters were to be referred to Sharia courts, and issues concerning established laws and state regulations were to be handled by the Imperial Council (*Âlî Meclis*). (TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, n.d.)

2. Legal Framework

In the Ottoman Empire, dhimmis (non-Muslim subjects) were taxed in accordance with Islamic law. Additionally, they were also subject to a number of customary taxes. As is well known, dhimmis were liable for two specific taxes—jizya and kharaj—which were not collected from Muslim subjects and which defined their legal and social status. Beyond these, dhimmis were also subject to the general fiscal system of the Islamic state, and thus were obligated to pay the same taxes as Muslim reaya (subjects) under the empire's tax law (Cin & Akyılmaz, 2009, p. 174).

For example, a *musta'min*—a foreigner (typically a merchant) who was granted permission to reside in Ottoman territory with guaranteed security—was required to pay the jizya if he remained in Ottoman lands for longer than one year, and was not allowed to leave the country. Records from the Bursa *Ser'iye* Registers indicate that as early as the 15th century, some foreign merchants found ways to reside in major commercial centers like Bursa without paying the jizya. With the later development of capitulations, a more lenient approach was adopted in this matter. For instance, Iranian-Armenian merchants who typically came to Ottoman lands for trade were classified as jizya-payers (TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, n.d.).

There were no restrictions placed on dhimmis in terms of contract law or commercial law. They held property rights within the empire and enjoyed full freedom to engage in trade and enter into contracts.

By the mid-18th century, certain foreign states had acquired commercial privileges through capitulation treaties with the Ottoman Empire. These states issued berats (patents or warrants) to their nationals, enabling them to engage in commerce freely after paying certain taxes. Similarly, foreign governments began extending their protection to non-Muslim Ottoman subjects who served as translators, granting them merchant berats that also allowed them to trade freely. As a result of this practice, by the mid-18th century, the number of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects holding foreign berats surpassed the number of actual foreign nationals.

A firman issued in 1722 by Sultan Ahmed III noted that some Jewish and Christian Ottoman subjects were acquiring interpreter berats in order to exempt their relatives and associates from the jizya, thereby enabling them to conduct trade. Another firman from 1758 stated that certain Ottoman subjects had acquired patents from Christian states to avoid paying taxes and to reduce customs duties. The document further emphasized that such protection should not be extended to additional subjects, and that existing patents or certificates issued under these pretenses should be revoked (Keleş, 2015, p. 200).

2.1. Dispute Resolution and Legal Reforms in Commercial Law for Dhimmis

Disputes among dhimmis regarding obligations and commercial transactions were generally resolved according to their own legal traditions, just as in other areas of private law. However, in cases involving Muslims, dhimmis were required to appear before the shar'ī (Islamic) courts. It should be noted that religious communities were not always favorable to their members bringing legal matters before the Islamic courts. For instance, it is recorded that among Jews, seeking resolution in a shar'ī court could even lead to excommunication—a severe penalty within their religious framework.

Despite this, during proceedings, no formal distinction was made between Muslims and non-Muslims. A clear provision in the legal code of Sultan Selim II permitted dhimmis to bring their cases comfortably before the Islamic courts. In an article cited by Konan, legal historian Ronald Jennings concluded—based on his 17th-century research—that the widespread use of Islamic courts by dhimmis for civil matters significantly limited the judiciary authority of communal (religious) courts (Konan, 2015, pp. 178–179).

In the 19th century, modern institutional reforms took shape: in 1840, the Commercial Council was established under the Ministry of Commerce, which was transformed into a Mixed Commercial Court by 1847–1848. Following this, the 1860 Supplement to the Imperial Commercial Code (Ticaret Kanunname-i Hümayununa Zeyl) led to the establishment of commercial courts in both Istanbul and the provinces to handle all types of trade disputes.

With the onset of the Tanzimat era, civil courts (nizamiye) dealing with legal and especially commercial matters were in urgent need of a codified civil law. At that time, all members of commercial and nizamiye courts—except the presiding judge—were non-jurists, typically appointed bureaucrats. Nonetheless, a commercial code (Kanunname-i Ticaret) was drafted in 1850 based largely on the French Commercial Code (İnalcık et al., 1989, pp. 35–36).

The 1856 Islahat Edict (Reform Decree) brought further institutional changes: commercial and criminal cases involving Muslims and dhimmis—or dhimmis of different sects—were henceforth openly tried in mixed courts. The edict also granted dhimmis the right to own real estate, participate in banking and commercial ventures, and access European capital (sermaye-i Avrupa)—thus paving the way for deeper economic integration and financial opportunity (Cin & Akyilmaz, 2009, p. 182).

To streamline legal conflicts in commercial affairs, the Code of Procedure for Commercial Trials (Usul-i Muhakeme-i Ticaret Nizamnamesi) was promulgated in 1861, based on French legal models. It remained in effect until the promulgation of the Code of Civil Procedure (Hukuk Mahkemeleri Usulü Kanunu) in 1879.

As for maritime commerce, the Commercial Maritime Code (Ticaret-i Bahriye Kanunnamesi), which came into force in 1863, was not solely based on French law but also took into account maritime codes from other seafaring nations such as the Netherlands, Sardinia, and Prussia (Üçok et al., 2010, p. 357).

2.2. Commercial Education and Constitutional Guarantees for Economic Participation

The Kanun-i Esasi of 1876, the first constitution in the history of Turkish law, laid down general principles for all Ottoman citizens, including provisions applicable to non-Muslim subjects alongside Islam, which was recognized as the official state religion. Article 12 of the constitution clearly stated that all Ottoman citizens had the right to engage in trade, industry, and agriculture, and to establish any kind of commercial company, as long as their activities complied with the laws and regulations (Kenanoglu, 2008, p. 10).

Although liberal economic thought had some influence after the Tanzimat reforms, the ideology of economic nationalism became increasingly dominant, particularly during the Second Constitutional Era. Consequently, economic and commercial education was shaped by these broader ideological and political shifts.

During the later phase of the Second Constitutional Era—coinciding with World War I—a period of intense economic alertness emerged under wartime pressure. This economic awakening was soon reflected in the field of education. The Faculty of Law was reinforced with foreign scholars, while special attention was given to the Ticaret Mekteb-i Alisi (Higher School of Commerce). In fact, this institution even began publishing a journal in 1917, aiming to disseminate its teachings beyond the classroom.

Research on commercial education indicates that the goal of the Ticaret Mektebi was to train individuals equipped with contemporary commercial knowledge who could contribute to the nation's development through commerce. Originally established in 1883 under the name Hamidiye Ticaret Mekteb-i Âlîsi, the school underwent changes in curriculum, name, and location over time. In 1909, it was renamed Ticaret Mekteb-i Âlîsi, and its curriculum was revised in several key years, including 1915.

According to Osman Ergin, to understand the historical reluctance of Turkish-Muslim citizens to engage in commerce, one must examine the broader socio-economic history of the Ottoman Empire. This disinterest in trade can be traced to the prevailing perceptions of commerce and craftsmanship within Ottoman society and among its governing elite. Following the Tanzimat reforms, the liberalization of trade enabled individuals to open shops freely without strict regulation. This newfound freedom benefited non-Muslims the most. They already had established commercial ties with Europe, were familiar with European languages, customs, and commercial ethics, and raised their children to follow similar paths. Consequently, non-Muslims came to dominate the Ottoman trade sector after Tanzimat.

The capitulations further complicated this picture by preventing the state from adequately protecting local industries and traders. As European merchants enjoyed tax exemptions, Muslim traders—who lacked familiarity with European languages and commerce—began to withdraw from the economic sphere. While non-Muslim children were raised with commerce in mind, Muslim children increasingly enrolled in civil and military schools, eventually pursuing careers in government service or the military.

In response to this imbalance, the Ottoman state established the Ticaret Mektebi to promote commercial literacy among its Muslim population and to encourage participation in the business world (Özkul, 2006, pp. 326–327).

CONCLUSION

Since the Classical Period, the Ottoman Empire had control over key trade routes as a result of its conquests in the Balkans and the Middle East. Due to its vast geographical extent, the empire became home to a wide range of ethnic and religious communities. While the majority of the Ottoman population consisted of Muslims, the state itself was a multiethnic and multicultural entity. However, since Muslims were predominantly employed in government services and the military, non-Muslims were more inclined to engage in trade. The non-Muslim population—particularly Armenians, Greeks, and Jews—held significant linguistic and cultural advantages, which placed them in dominant positions within the commercial sphere. As long-established communities in these regions, they were also granted certain legal privileges.

Armenians were typically engaged in trades such as goldsmithing, moneychanging, timber commerce, peddling, and coffeehouse businesses. Greeks established dominance across a wide spectrum of commerce—from small-scale retail to wholesale—particularly in textiles, dried figs, raisins, olive oil, and liqueurs. Jews, who often lived in advanced commercial hubs like Bursa, pursued diverse occupations including law, custodianship, cloth trading, tax farming, jewelry, and mining. They were also involved in the trade of leather, rice, fish, dye, wool, silk, wine, marble, and various

agricultural goods. By the second quarter of the 19th century, the proportion of non-Muslims engaged in commerce far exceeded that of the Muslim-Turkish population.

In the realm of foreign trade, Britain and Russia were the Ottoman Empire's principal economic partners. However, as the Empire's power waned in the 19th century, it began offering significant concessions to these countries, particularly in the fields of taxation and commerce. The most notable example of this is the 1838 Treaty of Balta Limani. Prior to the treaty, customs duties with Britain stood at 3% for both imports and exports. After the agreement, export taxes increased to 12%, while internal transport and import duties were reduced to 5%.

Commercial relations with Russia, which dated back to the 15th century, entered a new phase with the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. Under the pretext of protecting Orthodox Christians, Russia began interfering in the Empire's internal affairs. The 6th article of the 1799 Treaty of Aynalıkavak further redefined trade relations between the two states. Following these agreements, Russia opened consulates not only across the Balkans but also in Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean port cities and islands, including Cyprus. These activities were also part of Russia's competitive response to Britain's expanding trade interests in the region.

Despite these disadvantages, the Ottoman Empire experienced substantial growth in foreign trade during the 19th century, establishing extensive trade networks with almost all major European powers.

From a legal perspective, the taxation of non-Muslims was originally rooted in Islamic law, particularly through the collection of the jizya tax. However, in the modern period, significant legal reforms emerged in response to evolving socio-political and economic realities. Beginning in the 18th century, the trend toward Westernization led to the expansion of capitulations and trade privileges granted to foreign states. Simultaneously, legal reforms were enacted to regulate both foreign and domestic trade, as well as to accommodate the commercial rights of non-Muslims. Among the most important developments were the establishment of the Trade Council (Ticaret Meclisi) under the Ministry of Trade in 1840, followed by the expansion of this institution into the Mixed Commercial Court (Karma Ticaret Mahkemesi) in 1847–48.

Although these reforms were not the result of grassroots demand, they nonetheless marked a significant step forward in the commercial legal rights of dhimmis. One final institution worth mentioning is the Ticaret Mekteb-i Âlîsi, or Imperial School of Commerce. Originally established in 1883 as the Hamidiye Ticaret Mekteb-i Âlîsi, it underwent changes in name and curriculum, adopting its final form by 1917. Unsurprisingly, it was non-Muslim students who benefited most from this institution, continuing their dominance in commercial education and practice.

The legal classification of dhimmi communities in the Ottoman Empire played a central role in determining their position within the economic and social order. This research demonstrates that non-Muslims were not passive minorities but active participants in commercial life, whose legal recognition often translated into tangible economic engagement.

Legal reforms introduced during the Tanzimat period—including the establishment of Mixed Commercial Courts and the reaffirmation of capitulations—enhanced the institutional protections afforded to non-Muslim merchants and landowners. These reforms helped formalize their status as legitimate economic agents, expanding their influence within the imperial economy.

The broader implication of these findings is that Ottoman legal pluralism should be studied not solely through Islamic jurisprudence, but also in terms of how it enabled minority inclusion and structured commercial interaction.

In contemporary debates on legal integration in multi-confessional societies, the Ottoman experience offers a valuable historical model. Future research may benefit from a comparative regional analysis of court records (*şer'iyye sicilleri*) to understand how legal practices concerning dhimmis varied across different Ottoman provinces.

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RELIGIOUS PROCESSES IN SOUTH AZERBAIJAN IN THE 1940S: BASED ON THE MATERIALS OF THE “AZERBAIJAN” NEWSPAPER (1947-1949)

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ABSTRACT

The article presents views on religious processes, struggle against religious problems, religious illiteracy, and ignorance based on the 1947-1949 issues of the “Azerbaijan” newspaper, the organ of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP) led by S.J. Pishevari. The newspaper was published in Tabriz between 1945-1946. After the defeat of the ADP government by the Pahlavi Shah’s army, the newspaper was published in Baku between 1947 and 1949 in Azerbaijani language with Arabic script. In the article, the works of some writers, such as S.J. Pishevari, the newspaper’s founder, ADF members - J. Mujiri, A. Shamida, G. Kandli, the Soviet press of the time, and other literature were also used. Based on the materials of the “Azerbaijan” newspaper, the article deals with 19th-20th century Azerbaijani thinkers M.F. Akhundzadeh, M.A. Sabir, “Molla Nasreddin” magazine, Mashruteh revolutionaries like M. Khiyabani, poets like M.A. Mojuz Shabustari, leading figures of ADP like M. Biriya and their religious perspectives, challenges against ignorance and superstitions. The article reflects the critical attitude of the “Azerbaijan” newspaper towards the Pahlavi rule, the non-democratic methods used by the government to keep the people in obedience, superstition, fanaticism, and reactionary religious views. Furthermore, the article argues how progressive intellectuals of the time invited the people to a democratic and secular regime. In particular, the interaction between the views of ADF writers on patriotism, nationalism, religious and moral values, and their outlook on human rights and freedom is presented. Moreover, these writers’ approaches to Christian missionaries and Islamic sects were analyzed comparatively, and the place and role of religious enlightenment in the formation of national consciousness and the national-religious movement was determined, by highlighting the ideas that are in step with the present. The article is notable for its contribution to the research and promotion of the struggle of the “Azerbaijan” newspaper and intellectuals of South Azerbaijan against religious superstition and ignorance.

Keywords: “Azerbaijan” newspaper, religious processes, superstition, religious illiteracy, ignorance.

INTRODUCTION

The “Azerbaijan” newspaper as an organ of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party mainly addressed issues such as criticism of the Pahlavi Shah regime and the struggle for national enlightenment and democratic rights. The religious processes of the time, the fight against religious ignorance, fanaticism and superstition, conservative clergy, and the criticism of the religious policy of the Pahlavis of Iran were also widely covered in the newspaper. For this purpose, the works of thinkers such as M.F. Akhundzadeh, M.A. Sabir, J. Mammadguluzade, examples from “Molla Nasreddin” magazine, and other press organizations, are given significant consideration in the paper. Particularly, articles by S.J. Pishevari, J. Mujiri, G. Kandli, A. Shamida, and other writers criticizing the religious policy of the Pahlavis, religious enlightenment, and fight against superstition, were published in the newspaper. The “Azerbaijan” newspaper featured the life stories of South Azerbaijani poets, such as M.A. Mojuz and B. Abbaszadeh (Hammal), and their poems exposing the flaws of the time under the influence of “Molla Nasreddin”.

1. An overview of religious enlightenment and the struggle against superstition in the “Azerbaijan” newspaper

The “Azerbaijan” newspaper extensively presented the 19th-century intellectual M.F. Akhundzadeh’s struggle for national enlightenment and against religious fanaticism and superstitions. The newspaper recorded that M.F. Akhundzade, the son of the Azerbaijani people and the first materialist philosopher in

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the Muslim East, in his famous philosophical work “Kemaluddovle Mektublari” (“Letters to Kemaluddovleh”), revealed the true nature of hypocritical and traitorous clergy, mullahs, and sheikhs. He wrote, O preachers and scientists, O charlatans, why do you frighten the poor people with the hellfire and do not allow them to contact other peoples and use the achievements of science and art? The newspaper stressed that, as in the time of M.F. Akhundzadeh, criticizing and exposing those hiding under the veil of a pious sheikh was necessary (“Dünya mədəniyyət xadimlərinin yığıncağında”, 1948, p. 4).

The “Azerbaijan” newspaper promoted “Molla Nasreddin” magazine, emphasizing its crucial role in national enlightenment and Azerbaijani literature and contributions to women’s freedom at the beginning of the 20th century (Təbatəbai, 1946, p. 4). The newspaper highly appreciated the contributions of J. Mammadguluzade and M.A. Sabir to the publication and their hard work in maintaining the linguistic purity of their mother tongue, featuring “There is no one who does not know them in the East” (Müciri, 1948, p. 4; Azərbaycan, 2022, p. 484).

The “Azerbaijan” newspaper reported about J. Mammadguluzade’s “Anamin Kitabi” (“My Mother’s Book”) and narrated the story of an Azerbaijani family whose children studied in Petersburg, Istanbul, and Najaf. According to the storyline of the play, three brothers who got different educations constantly have arguments on different ideologies, and each of them tries to promote his beliefs and the influence of his environment on others. It is clear from the play that the aggressor governments generally try to annihilate the mother tongue and culture of a nation as the major measure to keep them under constant control. Later, this play by J. Mammadguluzadeh was showcased in the Tabriz theater (Nikpur, 2020, p. 14).

Noting the educational feature of M.A. Sabir’s works, the “Azerbaijan” newspaper emphasized the significant impact of his exposing, logical, and bitter criticisms of exploiters—khans, beys, landlords, clerics, merchants, and judges (Qurbani, 1948, p. 3). The newspaper mentioned that Sabir’s poems were eagerly read in the trenches of Sattarkhan devotees, as those poems reflected the mashruteh movement and empowered the devotees (Həbibi, 1948, p. 4). The “Azerbaijan” newspaper advocated M.A. Sabir’s “Hophopname” and presented the availability of “Hophopname” in Tabriz libraries to southern readers (Müsəvvər, 1946, p. 2).

The “Azerbaijan” newspaper specifically emphasized the satirical poems written under the influence of Sabir by M.A. Mojuz, Bayramali Abbaszadeh (Hammal) (Bayramali, 1948, p. 3), and M.H. Burkhanı, a prominent representative of the “21 Azer” movement (Qurbani, 1948, p. 3).

The “Azerbaijan” newspaper indicated the profound importance of “Molla Nasreddin” magazine, its influence on Southern Azerbaijanis, and the emergence of a new trend in Azerbaijani literature following the publication of “Molla Nasreddin”. Many contemporary poets and literary men who were mainly engaged in writing ghazals, qasida, and noha (laments) joined this trend. “Molla Nasreddin” crossed the borders and was brought to Tabriz, Khoy, Ardabil, and other cities despite the obstacles. The magazine attracted the attention of many readers and writers in South Azerbaijan. Mirza Gafar Natig Siyahpushu was among the poets who wrote under the influence of “Molla Nasreddin”, like M.H. Burhani and B. Abbaszadeh (Həbibi, 1948, p. 3).

The “Azerbaijan” newspaper involved a wide range of discussions on the revolutionary poet M.A. Mojuz Shabustari. The newspaper stated how his poems revealed imperialist policies conducted by the governments and their henchmen in the Middle East. It made clear that the creation of religious divisions among the Muslim population, the spread of superstition and fanaticism, and the desecration of holy temples and places of one tribe by the hands of another tribe were the deeds of British intelligence. M.A. Mojuz, called “one of the leading figures of Azerbaijani literature” by the newspaper, argued that the sects that divide Muslims are the product of the British (Həbibi 1947, p. 3).

Through poems written in the style of M.A. Sabir, M.A. Mojuz called on the people to be active in the resistance against British imperialism. The newspaper showed that despite the Pahlavi government’s refusal to allow the publication of M. A. Mojuz’s poems, the people were able to get and read them and see reflections of their lives in them (Həbibi, 1948, p. 4).

On the 20th anniversary of the death of M. A. Mojuz Shabustari, Jafar Khandan wrote an article in the Communist newspaper "Communist" entitled "People's Poet of South Azerbaijan" in which he described the poet's activities and the oppression and persecution he faced. Born in a poor family, the poet explicitly conveyed the shortcomings of his time, the bereavement of the people, and the fact that freedom and independence could only be achieved through revolution. His satires mercilessly exposed all the reactionary forces, from the "petty" people who engaged in snake charming, fortune-telling, and witchcraft to the political diplomats of American, English, and German imperialists and the Shah's government, saying:

"Əbəs yerə əl açıb göydən istədik imdad,
Bizi bu qədər bəlayə düçər edən odur!
Əlac yoxdur bizə şeyxdən, nə də şahdan,
Vəkildən üz əlini, çünki mülkədar odur!" (Əliyev, 2020, p. 112).

Another prominent poet of the Mashruteh period was Bayramali Abbaszadeh from Sarab. The "Azerbaijan" newspaper wrote that B. Abbaszadeh dropped out of school due to poverty and worked as a laborer. When the Mashruteh movement against Muhammad Ali Shah started in Tabriz, he took up arms and joined the followers of Sattarkhan. B. Abbaszadeh's first acquaintance with literature was in the group of devotees. The "Azerbaijan" newspaper wrote that "Molla Nasreddin" magazine, which provided great help to the Mashruteh movement with its revolutionary articles, attracted the attention of B. Abbaszadeh, and Sabir's revolutionary poems had a great impact on him. Fed up with the oppression of khans and landowners, the poet dedicated his first poems to exposing the enemies of the revolution. After the defeat of Mashruteh, he moved with his family to the South Caucasus and supported them by working as a porter in Baku.

B. Abbaszadeh had his poems published in "Molla Nasreddin" and met M. A. Sabir. B. Abbaszadeh wrote satirical poems under the pseudonyms "Gulzar" and "Hammal" against reactionism, superstition and ignorance (Bayraməli, 1948, p. 3). The poet died in 1926 in Baku.

"Communist" newspaper promoted B. Abbaszadeh's revolutionary activities and endeavors and gave examples of his works. His hatred for the Pahlavis and his call for the people to struggle were reflected in his poetry:

"Qoyma mehtər başında tac olsun,
Füqəralar həmişə ac olsun,
Parçala təxti, qoy tarac olsun" (Sadıq, 1946, p. 2; Əliyev, 2020, pp. 108-109).

One of the ADF activists who engaged in revolutionary activities in the first half of the 20th century was Mahammadhusayn Burhani from Marand. He received his primary education in Marand, secondary religious education in Tabriz, and mastered Arabic and Persian languages perfectly. Unsatisfied with religious ideology, M. Burhani turned to philosophical thought. The "Azerbaijan" newspaper highlighted that Sabir's criticisms of khans, beys, clergymen, judges, landlords, and merchants had a great influence on Burhani (Qurbani, 1948, p. 3). Because M. Burhani saw the bitter fate of the Azerbaijani people and exploitation and oppression reflected in the pages of "Molla Nasreddin" magazine and the works of M.A. Sabir. All this fueled his desire for revolutionary endeavors. Among the poor masses, especially among the peasants, he began to criticize the corrupt morals of the government and landlords and their oppression of the people. Due to his revolutionary propaganda, M. Burhani was imprisoned for a long time during the reign of Reza Shah. M. Burhani did not stop his revolutionary engagements even after he was released following Reza Shah's abdication in 1941. An active member of the ADF, M. Burhani, was executed by the Shah's government.

The newspaper "Azerbaijan" called Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani, the founder of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party and the "Azadistan" government, "one of the distinguished Sayyids and great thinkers of Azerbaijan". It is stated that he taught theology in Tabriz, had extensive knowledge of religious sciences, and served in the Karimkhan mosque (Novruz, 1945, p. 2 and Pişəvəri, p. 155). The newspaper portrayed Sheikh Khiyabani's struggle for the freedom of the people against the Shah and foreign imperialism

(Novruz, 1945, p. 2) and provided information about the newspaper “Tajaddid” published by him (Novruz, 1945, p. 2). S.J. Pishevari wrote a series of articles dedicated to M. Khiyabani with the signature “Novruz” in the newspaper “Azerbaijan”, characterizing ADF’s “Tajaddid” as M. Khiyabani’s “immortal work” (Novruz, 1945, p. 2).

M. Biriya, one of the leaders of the ADF, was an outstanding poet and enlightened democratic intellectual. Although he was one of the leaders of the ADF, he was repressed and threatened with dismissal by the Soviets for his engagement in religious worship (Balayev, p. 318). After the collapse of the ADF, M. Biriya’s religious-nationalist attitude during his emigration to the USSR, his desire to return to Tabriz, his letters to the Soviet government demanding the abandonment of the Cyrillic alphabet and the return to the old alphabet, his characterization of Armenians as enemies of Turks, his demand for the return of all exiled Muslims to their homeland led to M. Biriya’s imprisonment for many years (Balayev, pp. 59-60). Persecuted in Soviet Azerbaijan, he had to become a mullah. Only after the fall of the Pahlavis, he returned to Tabriz in his old age. However, he was accused of being a communist and was tortured to death in 1985 (Çeşmazər, p. 10). On his tombstone are the following lines written in the style of Nesimi:

“Vurma əl türbətimə, türbəti-Adəm də mənəm,
Nə o dünya, nə bu dünya, iki aləm də mənəm.
Arama qəbrimi, axtarma mənim başdaşımı
Rəsmdə Həzrəti Nuh, isimdə Xatəm də mənəm” (Turan, 2019, February 25).

One of the active writers of the “Azerbaijan” newspaper, A. Shamida denounced those who exploit religion and sect as a political instrument and those who follow them obviously. In his article “Is it Religious Propaganda or Political Action!”, A. Shamida criticized those who used religion as a mechanism to hinder resistance of the people for freedom. A. Shamida showed that the imperialists and their henchmen utilized the national and religious prejudices of the people to create animosity and hostility and prevent the people from achieving an independent and peaceful existence (Şəmidə, 1949, p. 4). Moreover, they disseminated sectarian propaganda and corrupted the minds of the people with their reactionary ideas and tried to deter the masses from the struggle for independence. A. Shamida emphasized that the foreign imperialist governments and their occupation army or experts, including reactionary religious figures, weaken the people they exploit. He showed that the foreign missionaries operating in Iran are the agents of the imperialists (Şəmidə, 1949, p. 4).

A. Shamida mentioned that Muhammad Reza Shah met the Pope of Rome in the Vatican, received a medal, and participated in the Vatican conference, where decisions were made to promote Christianity in Iran in 1948. He added that the number of Christian missionaries increased in Urmia, Tabriz, Hamadan, Tehran, and various regions of Iran following the visits of the representatives of the Pope to Tehran. The author noted that the number of missionaries in the churches and schools was greater than the number of teachers and doctors in their establishments. The author emphasized their main engagement as poisoning the minds of the people. Those brought up in these schools and churches have become the servants of the American and British imperialists, carrying out propaganda and espionage for their benefit. They challenged the independence of the people and acclaimed the imperialists in their religious books and speeches (Şəmidə, 1949, p. 4). A. Shamida asserted that the Christian missionaries were mainly countered against the USSR in South Azerbaijan and striving to turn Iran into a colony of imperialist powers.

J. Mujiri, one of the prominent writers of the “Azerbaijan” newspaper, condemned the wrong religious policy conducted in the country under the guise of religion in his article “Let Iranian Reactionaries be Disgraced Once Again!”. The author reproached the Pahlavi government and its foreign patrons who employed religion for political motives. He then exposed how the British imperialists guided the pro-Shah reactionaries and corrupted the minds of the Iranian people through their frauds hidden under the veil of pan-Islamism (Müciri, 1949, January 15, p. 3). The author criticized those who oppressed the people by trying to keep the hope of the hereafter and those who claimed that “the result of enduring hunger and poverty will be favorable” (Müciri, 1948, p. 1).

J. Mujiri asserted that infectious diseases were transmitted among pilgrims from Iran visiting Mecca

and Medina. Many pilgrims die of lack of medicine or become beggars there due to poverty, while the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia impose heavy taxes on Iranian pilgrims and insult them. The article critiques the fact that wealthy Iranian pilgrims, who ignore the hungry and poor in their own country, spend their money in Arabia and other countries (Müciri, 1949, pp. 1, 3).

2. Criticism of Pahlavi religious policy in the “Azerbaijan” newspaper

The Pahlavi dynasty was the major target of criticism in the “Azerbaijan” newspaper. The reactionary clergy played a significant role in the election of Reza Khan Pahlavi, the first ruler of the dynasty, in 1924. Reza Khan’s desire to establish a republican structure in the country, in the example of Ataturk’s Turkey, was not welcomed by reactionary clerics. These clerics evaluated the republican system to be against Islam. Thus, they were able to convince Reza Khan to preserve the Shah regime in the country (Kurtuluş, 2008, p. 67).

Reza Shah was an active defender of secular Western nationalist values and a firm opponent of Sharia. According to the “Azerbaijan” newspaper, before assuming power and in the early days of his reign, Reza Khan would wear black clothes on Ashura days, join the mourners, cover his head in the mud, and wear a chain ("Məzəhəb iddiyasında olub", p. 4), pretending to be a religious and sectarian fanatic. However, after he became a Shah and consolidated his power, Reza Khan forbade the observance of the Ashura ceremony in the courtyard of Imam Reza’s temple and arrested and killed protestors (Yusifi, 1948, p. 4). Although the policy of Reza Shah provoked many uprisings in Iran, they were forcibly suppressed by the Shah. The “Azerbaijan” newspaper highlighted that it has never been seen anywhere in the modern world that the army intervenes in religious affairs, prevents people from demonstrating their religious feelings, and shoots unarmed and defenseless people (“Azərbaycan” qəzeti, 2022, p. 694). In 1928, the wearing of religious clothes by non-clergymen was prohibited. In 1935, women were forbidden to wear headscarves. They were forced to wear hats and caps. Education was secularized, and schools where girls and boys studied together were opened (Иванов, 1977, p. 343). The “Azerbaijan” newspaper claimed that the Shah’s forcible removal of women’s headscarves had nothing to do with women’s freedom. Because women were not granted social and political rights. It formed possible conditions for gendarmes to take bribes under this pretext ("İran qadınları öz azadlıqları", 1949, p. 1).

Those who opposed Reza Shah’s radical secularism were subjected to severe punishments. Reza Shah’s visit to Turkey in 1934 and meeting with Ataturk reinforced his policy of secularism (Kurtuluş, 2008, p. 67). To quell the protests against the Shah regime, Reza Shah began to support the clergy under him. Reza Shah tried to consolidate his authority over the higher religious centers of Tehran against the teachers and clerics of the regional madrasahs, which were inclined towards independence, such as Qum, Najaf, and Mashhad. He announced that “Tehran should be one of the most important centers of religious education”. In an apparent attempt to demonstrate his supposed pro-Islamist position, the Shah established the Islamic University in Tehran and provided it with substantial support. The “Azerbaijan” newspaper mentioned that the Shah and the ruling class, who had acquisitive intentions toward the property and honor of the people, were trying to pretend to be supporters of religion (Şəkibxan, 1948, p. 1). The newspaper further uttered that the Americans and the British, with the help of the Shah’s government, were trying to establish a foundation for promoting the policy of the Shah regime in universities and other schools (Şəkibxan, 1948, p. 4).

Reza Shah’s secular policy further strengthened the Zoroastrian community, which had a weak position in Iran, granting a seat in the parliament. Unlike Jews and Armenians, Zoroastrians were perceived as Iranians by the Muslim people (Cottam, 1979, pp. 86-87).

The situation of the Bahais was difficult during the Qajar period, just as it was during the Pahlavi period. R.V. Cottam writes that the Bahais, who call for universality, peace, and brotherhood, were the religious minority that has faced the worst treatment in Iran. Because, according to Muslims, unlike the people of the Book (pre-Islamic Abrahamic religions - A.F.), Bahais were seen as “heretics”, and their rights were not recognized (Cottam, 1979, pp. 87 -88).

During the era of Shah Pahlavi, the “Law on Civil Service” was enacted, and Bahais were deprived of their pensions. In 1924, with the fatwa of religious leaders, Bahai raids were carried out in some cities of the country. “Bahai Centers” were looted and destroyed. In 1925, by the Shah’s decree, Bahais were banned from working in government offices. Bahai officers were expelled from the army in 1932-1933. The Shah’s government banned the printing of Bahai literature and closed Bahai schools.

The “Azerbaijan” newspaper conveyed that Reza Shah’s tyranny brought Hitler’s fascist ideas and practices to the country, strengthening oppression and bondage. The Reza Shah government, which sought to strengthen its legitimacy on a religious basis, preached phrases like “shah sayaye-khodast” (“the shah is the shadow of God”) to people and the students in schools, forcing them to accept the “base” policies and dictatorship (“Azərbaycan” qəzeti, 2022, pp. 60, 200, 488).

Reza Shah’s alliance with Hitler led to his being overthrown by the Soviets and the British, and his son Muhammad Reza Shah ascended to the throne. During Muhammad Reza Shah’s reign, the situation of the Bahais became even more complicated. The arrest of Bahai leaders was accompanied by an escalation in the killing of Bahais. The government launched a smear campaign, claiming “Bahais are collaborating with communists”. The Shah’s government addressed the public and ordered the “rooting out of the Bahai sect”, initiating mass arrests and killings against the Bahais (Cəfərov, 2022).

Muhammad Reza Shah, unlike his father, refrained from German fascism but maintained a dictatorial regime in the country. During this period, English and American imperialism replaced German fascism. Muhammad Reza Shah’s dictatorial policy was also supported by reactionary clerics who called the Shah “Zillullah”, meaning the Shadow of God (Zakir, 1948, p. 3). Ignorant clergymen continued to exploit the people and used Islam as a means for this policy. That propaganda was even being spread in schools, saying that the Shah was “Zillullah” and that “obeying the Shah is a sacred duty” (Bəhrəmi, 1949, p. 1). S.J. Pishevari criticized the Shah government and officials for using religion for their covetous purposes. He wrote that they looted the property of the Muslim people, but when their property was damaged, they cried out that they were losing their religion. ADF had to rebel precisely because the government was looting and bribing (Əliyev, 2023, p. 229).

Although the Shah used religious slogans to stay in power, he killed patriotic, progressive, and democratic clerics such as Sheikh Muhammad Ali Ali-Ishaq Khoi. The “Azerbaijan” newspaper expressed condolences over the murder of this prominent clergyman. The newspaper reported that the true face of A. Qavam, who employed religion and sects for political purposes, was revealed (“Tərhim və təziyə”, 1946) November 25, p. 1; (Məzhəb iddiasi olub, 1946, p. 1).

The Shah’s government used Mujtahid Abulhasan Siqatulislami, the member of parliament and the Tabriz cleric, to divert the ADF from the struggle for democracy and to find common ground with the Shah (Rəhimli, 2009, p. 74). ADF fought against the Shah regime, as well as against pro-Shah, reactionary, and fanatic clerics. S.J. Pishevari stated in his speeches that they did not agree to representatives like Siqatulislami speaking on behalf of Azerbaijan in the Assembly (Qızıl səhifələr, 1946, p. 57). Although A. Siqatulislami promised to support the ADF (Həsənli, 1998, p. 99), he actually saw the ADF as pro-Soviet and called on the people to take up armed resistance against them. Encouraged by A. Siqatulislami, Azerbaijani clerics like Mirza Hussain Vaiz spoke in the parliament in Tehran, calling the people to resist the Soviet occupation and the ADF. Pro-Shah clerics accused the Azerbaijani democrats of betraying Islamic ideas and of the ADF’s decisions being against religion (Гасанлы, 2006, pp. 142, 148, 215, 354). As a matter of fact, these clerics were large landowners and worried that the unjust wealth they had accumulated over time would be taken from them. Fleeing from South Azerbaijan to seek refuge in Tehran, the reactionary, pro-Shah clerics established an association called “Liberation of Azerbaijan” with the encouragement of the Shah’s government. This society was conducting propaganda against the ADF and its democratic values. Although the Pahlavi government was against religion, it supported and used reactionary clerics like Mir Khas Ardabili and Mirza Hussain Vaiz under the pretext of protecting Islam. These reactionary clerics labeled ADF members as enemies of religion and sect, infidels, and atheists, inciting the Muslim populace to revolt against the ADF (Əlizadə, 2017, pp. 18, 20, 31). One of the reactionary religious

leaders was Seyyed Abulgasim Kashani. The “Azerbaijan” newspaper mentioned that he was a “drug addict hiding behind the mask of a cleric and a mullah” (“21 Azər” in 3-cü ildönümü”, 1948, p. 4) and “a reactionary element” (Həbs olunanlardan, 1949, p. 4). The newspaper showed that he and M.H. Vaiz had propagated Hitler and fascism during the Reza Shah period (Haşimi, 1948, p. 4). The “Azerbaijan” newspaper criticized Nazi supporters and published articles praising the victory of the Soviet Union against German fascism (“Alman faşistlərinin Sovet”, 1948, pp. 1, 4).

S.J. Pishevari wrote that during the Məsruteh period in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the reactionaries pressured everyone they wanted under the pretext of being Babi, even taking away a piece of bread from them. He later emphasized that they applied the same policy against the ADF, slandering the democrats with the name “Babi” (Qızıl səhifələr, 1946, p. 106). During the fall of the ADF in December 1946, thousands of men and women who supported the ADF were killed and raped by Shah-loyalist bandits under the fatwas issued by these reactionary clerics (Əlizadə, 2017, pp. 64-65). The pro-Shah newspaper “Demokrat-e Iran” asserted the Pishevari supporters as “individuals without a god and a homeland”, fascists hiding under the guise of democracy. The “Azerbaijan” newspaper described such religious speeches by the pro-Shah reactionary elements as “an insult to religion and the Islamic world” (Haşimi, 1948, p. 4), accusing the Shah and his supporters of having “no religion, no sect, no fear of God” (“Azərbaycan” qəzeti, 2022, p. 700). During this period, more than five thousand Azerbaijanis who managed to escape persecution and massacres were forced to migrate to Soviet Azerbaijan (Abışov, 2023, p. 98).

The ADF, led by S.J. Pishevari, tried to normalize relations with progressive clerics. S.J. Pishevari sought support for this purpose by meeting with the spiritual leaders of South Azerbaijani Shiites, Mirza Khalil Aga Mujtahid, Haji Mirza Baghir Aga, and Mujtahid Seyyid Muhammed Hussain Tabatabai (Gacanlı, 2006, p. 215). However, Mujtahid Tabatabai refused to support the Soviet ally ADF and moved from Tabriz to Qum. He later became famous as the author of the multi-volume Arabic Quran commentary, “al-Mizan” (Mertoglu, 2010, pp. 306-308).

One of the leading Azerbaijani scholars of the Pahlavi era, Tabriz-born S.M. Tabatabai, was famous for his religious-philosophical works, such as the 20-volume work “al-Mizan fi tafsiril-Qur'an”, “Qur'an der Islam” (“The Quran in Islam”), “Usule-falsafa ve revishirealizm” (“Philosophical Methodology and Revised Realism”), “Bidayetul-hikmah” (“The Beginning of Wisdom”), and “Nihayatul-hikmah” (The End of Wisdom). In his works, many subjects of classical Islamic philosophy have been addressed. Topics such as the comparative study of Eastern and Western philosophies, psychology, sociology, and history have been examined. S.M. Tabatabai was a scholar known for his philosophical research on the interpretation of the Quran, the revival of traditional wisdom, and skillfully combining these two fields. S.M. Tabatabai's inclusion of classical Islamic philosophical thought in his works, his incorporation of Sufism, and his efforts to synthesize philosophy with religious sciences have led to the strengthening of the previously weakened position of Sufism and philosophical thought in the Islamic world. S.M. Tabatabai's reference to Sunni sources and Shia sources in his Quran commentary contributed to the strengthening of inter-sect rapprochement in the Islamic world. Western thinkers like H. Corbin have also placed great importance on the Tabatabai legacy and have supported it (Fərhadov, 2023, pp. 141-143).

M.H. Tabatabai was not the only person to leave Azerbaijan to protest S.J. Pishevari. The “Communist” newspaper expressed that pro-Shah officials who did not want to cooperate with the ADF went to Tehran (“İran Azərbaycanındakı vəziyyətə dair”, 1945, p. 1). R.V. Cottam emphasized that during the Pishevari government, approximately 100,000 people left Azerbaijan to protest the new rules and settled in other provinces of Iran (Cottam, 1979, p. 127). In the memoirs of some witnesses from that period, it should be noted that the arrival of the Soviet army in South Azerbaijan was equated with the occupation of Northern Iran by the Tsarist Russian army during the Constitutional (Mashruteh) Revolution and World War I. At that time, the Muslim population harbored distrust and suspicion towards the Russians. The distrust towards the ADF, which was an ally of the USSR, by some of the people stemmed from this (“Cənubi Azərbaycanda 21 Azər hərəkatı haqqında xatirələr”, 2017).

Ayatullah M. Shariatmadari, Mirza Javad Maliki al-Tabrizi, and Allame Abdulhussain al-Amini can be

cited as prominent Azerbaijani religious figures and thinkers of the period. M. Shariatmadari from Tabriz received advanced religious education in Qum and Najaf and returned to Tabriz as an Ayatullah in 1927 at the age of 19. Like his teacher, Ayatullah-Uzma (Grand Ayatullah) Hussain Burujerdi, he was also against the intervention of religion in politics. After the death of Hussain Burujerdi in 1961, M. Shariatmadari was recognized as the most influential religious figure in the Shia world. He founded the Muslim People's Party during the Islamic Revolution. M. Shariatmadari opposed the establishment of a religious state and demanded the establishment of a democratic state and the rights of South Azerbaijan. For this reason, he was arrested and mysteriously killed (Ələkbərli, 2021, pp. 630-633). Another spiritual thinker of the time, Mirza Javad, received advanced religious education in Tabriz, followed by Qum and Najaf. He is the author of religious and philosophical works such as "Irshadut-talib" ("Guide for the Student") and "Ususul-ghaza vash-shehadat" ("The Foundations of Justice and Martyrdom"). Abdulhussain al-Amini from Tabriz also achieved higher religious education in Tabriz and Najaf and earned the title of Mujtahid. Later, he engaged in teaching religion and Islamic philosophy in Tabriz. He authored a work titled "Fatihatu'l-Kitab", based on the Quran (Ələkbərli, 2021, pp. 586-587).

Although ADF members countered pro-Shah clerics, they expressed support for democratic-minded ones. ADF emphasized their instilling hope and confidence in the people. S.J. Pishevari always remembered and respected the great spiritual scholars such as A. Bihbehani, S.M. Tabatabai, and M.K. Khorasani, who were mujtahids supporting the people against the Shah regime during the Constitutional Revolution (Pişəvəri, 1984, p. 404). S.J. Pishevari also had great hopes for the progressive clerics of his time and mentioned that "our government is a democratic government. Let the clergy and all classes come together and protect our autonomy" (Şəhrivərin on ikisi, p. 71). S.J. Pishevari criticized the teaching of religious sciences in Arabic and Persian by religious scholars, saying that speaking Turkish in madrasas is against Sharia. He invited them to preach sermons at mosques and to teach theological instruction at madrasas in their native languages (Qızıl səhifələr, 1946, pp. 34, 97).

In the ADF program, respect for national and religious values was emphasized, freedom of religion was acknowledged (Balayev, 2010, p. 318), and the importance of celebrating national and religious holidays was highlighted (Qızıl səhifələr, 1946, p. 65). The "Azerbaijan" newspaper called on Azerbaijani Muslims to unite around the ADF, saying "believers are brothers" based on the 10th verse of the Surah Al-Hujurat of the Qur'an. The newspaper analogized the Shah government to "a person who does not pray" ("Azərbaycan" qəzeti, 2022, pp. 188, 632).

Forward-thinking clerics supported the activities of the ADF and closely participated in the building of the nation-state. The "Azerbaijan" newspaper wrote that progressive clergymen encouraged the people to join this organization by giving speeches from the pulpits. For example, the clerics of Ardabil, Maku, Khoy, and other regions sent congratulatory telegrams to the ADF and the Constituent Assembly. Sheikh Musa Keyvani, the representative of Khoy, served as a part of the ADF. Despite the cleric Mirza Muhammad Aga Siqatulislami calling on the ADF not to harm Iran's territorial integrity ("Azərbaycan" qəzeti, 2022, pp. 21, 26, 93, 562, 608, 632), he cooperated with the ADF ("Ruhanilərimizin ehsasatı", 1946, pp. 1, 4).

M.A. Shabustari from the ADF met with some clerics in parliament, such as Mirza Muhammad Aga Siqatulislami, Mirza Rafi Aga Siqatulislami, and Mirza Mahmud Aga Sadr. Appreciating their support for the ADF, he stated that the state would protect their rights. He criticized the Shah's clerics and praised the role of forward-thinking religious scholars. He stressed the Shah government's crushing of the South Azerbaijani people, including progressive theologians, and turning the country into ruins. He argued that reform-oriented clerics should work for Azerbaijan's national unity and save the people from the disaster caused by the Shah ("Ruhanilərimizin ehsasatı", 1946, pp. 1, 4).

The Pahlavi government presented the ADF's policy as hostility towards the Muslim people and called on the pious to combat the ADF. The "Azerbaijan" newspaper stated that as a result of Pahlavi's flawed religious policy, ignorant mourners occupied the pulpits ("Ağayı Pişəvərinin nitqinin müxtəsəri", 1945, September 18, p. 1). However, Azerbaijanis do not believe in the "nonsense of the reactionary, treacherous press" and will not follow them. It compared the victory of the Pishevari government to the verses of the

Surah Al-Nasr in the Quran, which proclaims “the help of Allah and a decisive victory” (Pişəvəri, 1945, September 20, p. 1; Pişəvəri, 2016, pp. 118-120).

In the “Azerbaijan” newspaper, the Shah and his reactionary officials, as well as the Shah-supporting religious figures, were criticized for exploiting religion to manipulate the people. Their true faces, false piety, and actions against the people were revealed. The newspaper stated that the Shah described himself as an “Islam-panah” (“the refuge of Islam”) and that the Shah’s supporters referred to him as “Shahanshahe-Islam-panah” (“the King of the refuge of Islam”) (Yusifi, 1948, p. 1). The newspaper portrayed the Shah, whom the sycophantic officials called “zillullah”, as not the shadow of God but the “British’s shadow in Iran” (Azəroğlu, 1948, p. 3). The newspaper emphasized Shah’s crimes and the bloodshed in Azerbaijan, mentioning their marks left in history and hearts. Those who called Muhammad Reza “Shahanshahe-Islam-panah” were declared the greatest enemies of Islam in the newspaper (Yusifi, 1948, p. 4).

The Pahlavis organized “prayer ceremonies” in mosques in the name of the Shah to consolidate their power (“Rəzmara yaltaqlıq edir”, 1949, p. 3). Fearing that Muslims would rebel against the tyrannical Shah, they created contradictions and conflicts among the people and sects in the country. The “Azerbaijan” newspaper asserted that the Shah’s supporters tried to organize national genocide among the people living in Iran, using the British colonizers’ slogan “Sow discord, rule!”.

The first tool they employed to achieve this plan was the sects. One day, they would create conflict between Sunni and Shia, and the next day, between Muslim and Armenian (Kəndli, 1948, p. 1). The newspaper provided examples of Azerbaijani poet Mirza Ali Mojuz’s poems criticizing the British government and the Shah regime for their nefarious policies:

“Söylər hər kəs küçədə və bazzarda:

“İngilis barmağı var bu karda (işdə-Ə.F.)” (Həbibli, 1947, p. 3).

The “Azerbaijan” newspaper stated that the Shah government’s policy was “against the sect”. It criticized their use of religion to deceive the people and maintain power and their theological schools that train royalist clerics. Nevertheless, the newspaper asserted that the people did not believe in the Shah. It wrote that instead of spreading knowledge and literacy, the Shah wanted to strengthen superstitions and myths, keeping the people in ignorance to solidify the foundations of his power (Şəkibxan, 1948, p. 3).

The “Azerbaijan” newspaper mentioned the spread of retrogressive ideas by imperialist powers under the guise of sectarian propaganda and the dissuading masses from the struggle for freedom. Imperialists were urging the people to endure the oppression and plunder of imperialism by creating organizations that spread sectarianism and superstition. However, the newspaper believed that the Iranian people would win in their struggle against local rulers, foreign imperialists, and the backward-looking clerics (Şəmidə, 1949, p. 4). The “Azerbaijan” newspaper wrote portrayed that, as in the time of M.F. Akhundzadeh, ignorant liars hiding under the guise of pious sheikhs are running rampant in the Middle East (“Dünya mədəniyyət xadimlərinin yığıncağında”, 1948, p. 4).

The “Azerbaijan” newspaper announced that pro-government newspapers, state radio, and government propagandists deceived poor workers with religious slogans, trying to calm them with “fate, destiny, and predestination” (Məhəmmədzadə, 1949, p. 1). They tried to deter people from the struggle with trivial and meaningless words like “the state cares for the people, patience, and tolerance are beautiful qualities, we should be tolerant, we should be loyal to the Shah”. However, according to the newspaper, if you ask any villager or worker in the country what life is like right now, they will say: I am hungry, I am poor, I have no supply for tomorrow. There was an irreconcilable enmity between the Shah and the poor people (İran zəhmətkeşlərinin tələbatı 1948, p. 1).

In the “Azerbaijan” newspaper, the speech given by Maryam Firuz, a Qajar princess and women’s rights advocate from Tabriz, at the newly organized International Women’s Congress in Budapest was presented to the readers. It was revealed here that the government created obstacles for Maryam Firuz to prevent her from attending this event (Şəmidə, 1948, p. 1). However, she managed to convey the plight of Muslim women to the congress participants by attending the event. She stated that the Shah government sold its people to foreigners. Addressing the congress participants, she called on them to protest the policies of the

Shah government and Western imperialism ("Beynəlxalq Qadınlar Təşkilatının ikinci konqresində", 1948, December 22, p. 1). It became clear that restrictions on women were not limited to the Shah government's harsh measures; reactionary individuals also pressured women by deeming secular education sinful. In the press, they issued articles, speeches, and talks against women's freedom. Reactionary forces tried to ensure women remained ignorant ("8 Mart dünya qadınlarının beynəlxalq bayramı", 1948, p. 1).

Indeed, real women's rights in Iran were granted by the ADF government in 1945-1946, not by the Pahlavis. During the Pahlavi era, women were given the right to vote and be elected only in 1962, and very few female parliamentarians were elected in the first elections. Although some women were appointed as ministers in high positions, most of the significant positions in society belonged to elite families. Thus, there was no significant change in the lives of middle-class people. Although the first female MPs were elected to the parliament after 1968, they could not establish proper communication with the women in society and protect their rights. Therefore, they could not gain a significant position within the women's community. The main reason for this issue was that they entered parliament not by the people's will but with the government's permission (Abdollahifard, 2021, p. 370). Despite some women being members of parliament, ministers, or judges, they were not actually participating in real politics. The Pahlavis raised the legal marriage age for girls from 13 to 18 only after 1962. Women were allowed to file for divorce. The number of women a man can marry has been reduced to one (Rodriguez, 2002). In 1945-1946, the ADF government provided women with equal social and political rights to men. The "Azerbaijan" newspaper reported that the "Azerbaijan Women's Conference" was held several times in Tabriz, where reports on "Women's Citizenship Rights" were introduced and women were educated (Faiq, 1946, p. 4). However, after the defeat of the ADF government by the Shah's army in December 1946, women's rights were abolished. Despite this defeat, the "Azerbaijan" newspaper did not lose hope and believed that true human freedom would be restored. The newspaper highlighted that true women's freedom could not be granted by the "bandit" Shah government, which was a "puppet" of imperialism, but rather by the people's government, which was not far off in time ("17 Dey İran qadınlarının "Azadlıq bayramının" həqiqi mənası", 1948, p. 4).

CONCLUSION

Finally, we can say that the Shah regime's use of reactionary religious ideas and sectarianism to strengthen its power and exploit the people has been continuously criticized by the ADF and the "Azerbaijan" newspaper. While the newspaper promoted Islamic unity, religious enlightenment, and progressive religious ideas, it emphasized the importance of progressive clergymen in serving the people. The religious and political issues of the era, the use of religion as a political tool by the Pahlavis, the violations of women's rights in the country, and the struggles of Azerbaijani human rights defenders like Maryam Firuz were discussed. The article is significant for the examination of the democratic awakening, fight against religious radicalization, superstitions, and ignorance in South Azerbaijan. The article is also beneficial for examining and promoting the history of the struggle of the writers of the "Azerbaijan" newspaper against reactionary and authoritarian authorities who exploit religion for undemocratic purposes and the pro-Shah clerics who support them.

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INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION (2+4 NEGOTIATIONS) AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

After the Second World War, by the decision of the Potsdam conference, the territory of Germany was divided into 4 occupation zones of the allies. Ideological differences with the USSR, as well as different ideas about what the future of Germany would be, forced the Western allies to unite and then grant independence to the Germans. As a result, in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was formed in the former American, British and French occupation zones. In response, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) appeared in the east - in the former Soviet occupation zone. 1989-1990 was a period of unexpected events in international politics. The most important of these events was the unification of the divided Germany. When the Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989, policymakers faced the unprecedented challenge of establishing the foundation for a unified, stable, and prosperous Germany within a peaceful Europe. What were policymakers' expectations as they sought to create viable institutions for a world beyond the Wall and indeed the Cold War? And how did these expectations relate to the eventual outcome of their efforts? With the reunification of Germany, and even before that, some concerns and fears about a united Germany began to resurface in Europe. France and England made every effort to prevent or at least delay the reunification of Germany. Nevertheless, with the support of the United States and the consent of the USSR, Germany was reunited and became a fully sovereign state.

Keywords: FRG, GDR, reunification, USA, USSR, France, Britain

INTRODUCTION

The German-German rapprochement stirred up the public consciousness of almost all European countries, especially the closest allies and neighbors of the FRG and the GDR. Politicians, diplomats and scientists were aware that the emerging scenario of events on German soil entailed serious structural changes in Europe. Concern that this process could go unchecked and cause irreparable damage to peace, security and stability on the continent grew in all European capitals. The prospect of a rapid state unification of the FRG and the GDR threatened to destroy the already fragile balance, the foundations of which were noticeably undermined as a result of the continuing disintegration of the European "socialist camp" (Павлов, 2022). Paris and London initially took a rather tough position on the German question, where they clearly feared that Germany would become a new "superpower", which would inevitably lead to a decrease in the role of France and Great Britain in European and world affairs. France was particularly worried, which can be explained both by its geographical position and by its negative historical experience of relations with the Germans. The Paris-Bonn axis, which had been created with difficulty and which had given France the opportunity to actively influence the process of Western European integration and in the future to occupy one of the commanding heights in a "united Europe," was clearly cracking with the appearance of a powerful united Germany on the map of the continent. Discussion of the German question was made dependent on the demilitarization of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and on the rapprochement of their positions.

1. The main part of the article

The directionality of political change after November 1989 was driven by the imperatives that leaders had to seek and offer reassurance, restraint, and commitment. Each of the countries facing the prospect of German unification had worries. Britain and France worried about a more powerful and united Germany

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that operated outside European institutions, particularly the EC—and they worried about a Soviet backlash that might unseat Gorbachev. British prime minister Margaret Thatcher wanted to slow the process of unification down and saw Gorbachev and French president Mitterrand as potential allies (Anderson, 1999, p. 33). The Soviet Union—Gorbachev in particular—worried about its former ally being absorbed in Germany and the West. The expansion and encroachment of NATO loomed. The United States worried that Germany would drift out of the Atlantic system and fracture the Western alliance precisely at the moment when it was most triumphant. West German leaders worried about gaining the acceptance of its peers for a unified Germany. All of these leaders saw these problems in the context of various institutional configurations that would provide the anchors for assurances and signals of restraint and commitment—*institutions that would also shape the wider logic of the European and great-power order*. In the first instance, it was Helmut Kohl who was under pressure to reassure the Soviets and his European counterparts that a unified Germany would continue to be a good partner—restrained and embedded in European and Atlantic institutions. In an important speech to the Bundestag on November 28, 1989, Kohl outlined a ten-point program for German unification. It would be a staged process—exchanges, travel, movement toward “confederative structures,” culminating in a single federal Germany. Kohl sought to reassure Germany’s neighbors, arguing that inter-German relations should take place within a larger European process that would allow for “an organic development which takes into consideration the interests of all parties concerned and guarantees a peace order in Europe.” (Zelikow, 1997, p. 120). Kohl did not mention NATO in his speech, but in a message to President Bush following the speech, the chancellor reaffirmed West Germany’s “unwavering loyalty” to NATO (Zelikow, 1997, p. 122). This strategy of linking German unification to European integration became the centerpiece of Kohl’s diplomacy in the months that followed. The idea was to reassure the other great powers that a unified Germany would be deeply embedded in European institutions. It was a strategy of binding—so as to reduce the resistance of worried neighbors to a more powerful Germany. “Pool sovereignty,” Elizabeth Pond argues, “quickly became the preoccupation of Chancellor Kohl,” who shared the nightmare of his “famous nineteenth-century predecessor, Otto von Bismarck—a Germany surrounded by a hostile coalition of neighbors.” And so, his strategy of “warding off this danger was to bind his countrymen irrevocably to a pan-European structure and preclude ‘renationalization’ of defense and foreign policy on the continent.” (Pond, 1999, p. 39). The basic orientation of German policy was to reassure its neighbors—both East and West—that a unified and inevitably more powerful Germany would be deeply enmeshed in wider regional institutions. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher articulated this basic German view in a January 1990 speech:

“We want to place the process of German unification in the context of EC integration, of the CSCE process, the East-West partnership for stability, the construction of a common European house and the creation of a peaceful European order from the Atlantic to the Urals.” (Zelikow, 1997, p. 335-338).

Genscher and other German leaders did not always mention NATO in these statements, which worried American officials in the early months of the unification debate, but the basic message was clear: to gain agreement on unification, Germany was prepared to further bind itself to its neighbors. The United States sought not only to reassure Gorbachev that Soviet security was not at risk in the unfolding developments but also to offer support to Kohl as he tried to allay the worries of European leaders. In September 1989, when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited Moscow, Bush sent a message along to Gorbachev stressing that change in Eastern Europe should not be taken as a threat to the Soviet Union (Sarotte, 2014, p. 73). In Washington on November 12, Secretary Baker had a weekend lunch with the Soviet ambassador and communicated his understanding of the importance of “keeping order.” (Bush, 1989, p. 67). At a summit of Soviet and American leaders in Malta in early December, Bush indicated to Gorbachev that the United States had not tried to exploit developments in Eastern Europe.

The central goal of American policy during these months was to ensure that a unified Germany remained firmly anchored in the Atlantic alliance. And during late 1989, the United States began pursuing a policy of linking support for German unification to assurances about Germany’s continued commitment

to European and Atlantic institutions. President Bush presented this view as American policy at a NATO meeting in Brussels on December 4 and later stated it in public: "Unification should occur in the context of Germany's continued commitment to NATO and an increasingly integrated European Community, and with due regard for the legal role and responsibilities of the Allied powers." (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998, p. 3). The American president argued that NATO should remain the guarantor of stability in Europe, and to this end, the United States remained committed to Europe. In effect, German unification would be rendered acceptable to its neighbors by the same means that a revived West Germany was rendered acceptable after World War II: Germany would be embedded in wider Euro-Atlantic institutions. The NATO alliance and European economic integration would bind Germany to Europe, and the United States would ensure agreement by adding its own security commitment. This sort of reassurance was necessary because the British and French leaders remained wary of a unified Germany. In a meeting with Bush at Camp David on November 24, 1989, Thatcher had restated her view that German unification would destabilize Europe, undercut Gorbachev, and work against the prospects for democracy in Eastern Europe. Mitterrand too had such concerns. In a meeting with Bush on St. Martin in the Caribbean on December 16, the French leader again reaffirmed his view that German unification must be linked to developments in NATO and the EC. Arms control, EC integration, European monetary union, and American cooperation with Europe must all be addressed together to create a new Europe in which German unification would be a part. "Otherwise," Mitterrand warned, "we will be back to 1913 and we could lose everything." (Bush, 1989, p. 201). These sorts of institutional linkages appeared over and over again in the following months. Specifically, the German pledge to redouble the commitment of a unified Germany to European integration was an essential part of the process of reassurance and the signaling of restraint and commitment. This was because Germany's European neighbors had serious concerns about how Germany would relate to the EC—concerns that Chancellor Kohl and his colleagues had to allay. According to Jeff Anderson, these were twofold. One was a general worry on the part of European partners about German unification and its implications for stability in Europe and the "European project." The other was a worry about securing an EC accession for the GDR as it made its transition. Both were concerns about how Germany would operate within the EC. As Jeff Anderson notes, "Bonn sought to signal and secure the maximum amount of continuity with its relationship to the EC." In emphasizing the connections between German unification and European integration, Kohl was able to build support for his cause (Anderson, 1999, p. 33).

At a meeting of EC leaders in Strasbourg on December 8, Mitterrand was able to gain Kohl's support for convening an intergovernmental meeting to amend the EC's Treaty of Rome to prepare the way for a new treaty of economic and political union. In return, the EC leaders adopted a statement that endorsed German unification within the context of wider European developments. Again in March 1990, Chancellor Kohl announced that his government was committed to the goal of economic and political union. This was reinforced one month later when Kohl and Mitterrand called for the convening of an intergovernmental conference on political union to run in parallel with the formal discussions over a European Monetary Union. It was these steps that set in motion negotiations that led to the Treaty on European Union, negotiated at Maastricht in December 1991 and signed by the leaders of the twelve European member governments in early February 1992. Germany was binding itself to Europe, even in the face of domestic German unease about economic and political union. Kohl was signaling that his country would indeed wear the "golden handcuffs" that tied a unified Germany to Europe (Ash, 1993, p. 358). Gorbachev and the Soviets initially rejected the idea of German unification—certainly a unified Germany within NATO. The initial position of Gorbachev was that the two German states were legal entities that should remain so. As the East German collapse and calls for unification proceeded, the Soviet position moved to support for some sort of confederation or "treaty community" between the two German states. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze sought to slow the momentum toward unification by proposing to reactivate the four-power rights in Berlin. Technically speaking, Berlin was still officially under four-power jurisdiction. The Soviet strategy was to take the control of events out of the hands of West Germany and to seek accord with worried British and French leaders over the pace and destination of political change. The Soviets called a meeting of fourpower

ambassadors so as to deliberate on “the control mechanisms created by the former allies of the anti-Hitler coalition.” (Stent, 1999, p. 102).

When German unification became impossible to stop, Gorbachev insisted that a unified Germany could not remain within NATO. Unification was possible, but Germany must be neutral and its military power limited. On Germany remaining in NATO after unification, Gorbachev told the press in Moscow on March 6, 1990: “It is absolutely out of the question.” The goal of American policy in the spring of 1990 was to gain Soviet acceptance of a unified Germany within NATO. The first move was to resist Gorbachev’s efforts to settle the question of Germany’s status among the Four Powers, a forum that would allow the Soviets to hold out for German unification contingent on its neutrality. The critical move occurred at the Ottawa summit in February 1990 of NATO and Warsaw Pact ministers when the parties accepted the United States proposal for a Two-plus-Four formula. This agreement put the decision into the hands of the Germans themselves, leaving the Allied parties in a secondary position to ratify Germany’s determination of its status. The United States also worked with its allied partners to allay Soviet fears about a unified Germany. The Soviets sent mixed signals. In a meeting with Secretary of State James Baker in February 1990, Gorbachev indicated that the Soviets did not worry about a united Germany. At other moments, Soviet leaders were less certain. At a Kremlin meeting on policy in January 1990, there were split opinions. Gorbachev adviser Anatoly Chernyayev, for example, thought that a united Germany inside of NATO was not a threat—quite the contrary, it was a source of some reassurance, particularly if Kohl linked unification to an “all-European process.” Others, such as Valentin Falin, thought it was wrong to accept the absorption of East Germany into West Germany and NATO. The United States tried to convince the Soviets that a unified Germany outside of NATO would be more dangerous than a Germany inside of NATO. This argument was advanced by Baker in talks with Shevardnadze in Moscow in February 1990. The Soviets by this time understood that unification could not be stopped. It was a question of Germany’s external affiliations. Shevardnadze argued that a unified Germany might eventually become militaristic and threaten the Soviet Union, hence their proposal for a disarmed and neutral Germany. Baker turned the argument around and posed the question to Gorbachev: Assuming unification takes place, what would you prefer: a united Germany outside of NATO and completely autonomous, without American forces stationed on its territory, or a united Germany that maintains its ties with NATO, but with the guarantee that NATO jurisdiction or troops would not extend east of the current line? (Gorbachov, 1996, p. 529). Baker’s argument in Moscow was that embedding German military power in Western institutions was preferable to neutrality, even to the Soviets. Gorbachev notes in his memoir that the second part of Baker’s statement eventually formed the basis for a compromise over Germany’s militarypolitical status. This was so even though at the time of the Moscow meeting the Soviet leader was unprepared to accept the proposal. The opening for compromise dealt with the specific guarantees that might be attached to unification about the size and configuration of NATO and German forces. In the months that followed, the United States and German leaders sought to reassure Gorbachev that NATO could provide the needed “safety net.” The Germans were themselves open to putting limitations on the positioning of NATO troops within what would be the former East Germany. In May 1990, Secretary Baker went to Moscow with a package of incentives prepared for talks within the Two-plus-Four talks—the so-called nine assurances. The steps that the West would be willing to take to meet Soviet security concerns included assurances that unification would be accompanied by new conventional and nuclear arms limitation agreements; a German affirmation not to possess or produce nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons; agreement that NATO troops would not be stationed in the former territory of the GDR; and a promise that NATO would undertake to revise its strategy and its posture within a transformed Europe (Zelikow & Rice, 1997, pp. 263–264; Garthoff, 1994, pp. 426–427). Most of these assurances had been presented to the Soviets during the previous few months, but the repackaging of them was itself part of the process of changing Soviet thinking. In German meetings with the Soviets during this period, they presented their own package of reassurances that dealt with force levels and territorial limitations as well as promises of economic assistance. The turning point came in May 1990 during Gorbachev’s visit to Washington. Although he initially proposed that a united Germany must belong to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the

Soviet leader conceded on this visit that all countries had the right to choose their own alliances. In agreeing to this principle, Gorbachev was effectively agreeing that Germany had a right to stay within NATO. The Four Powers could not dictate German alliance membership. In agreeing to this principle and allowing the Germans themselves to decide, the dispute over German membership in NATO was on the way to resolution (Oberdorfers, 1991, p. 429).

The Soviet leader heard American officials again make the argument that binding Germany to NATO was the most effective security strategy for all parties concerned. The Soviet Union was again being asked to see NATO—and Germany's role in it—as a security institution that could reduce Soviet worries rather than aggravate them. The American promise to recast NATO's mission was meant to make the alliance all the more acceptable. The great contest over what European institutions would emerge to support and contain German unification ended less than a year after the Wall went down. The Western institutions—NATO and the EC—were in place and available, and ultimately they served the needs that all parties had for reassurance and restraint. The Bush administration, of course, championed these institutions as the vehicle to accommodate and embed a unified Germany. This policy took shape almost immediately after November 9. As Secretary Baker prepared for his trip to Europe, State Department counselor Robert Zoellick wrote a memo that emphasized the importance of these various layers of Atlantic and European institutions. He argued that there was a need for a "New Atlanticism and a New Europe that reaches farther East." But the "architecture of the New Atlanticism and New Europe should not try to develop one overarching structure. Instead, it will rely on a number of complementary institutions that will be mutually reinforcing," including NATO, the CSCE, the WEU (Western European Union), and the Council of Europe (Sarotte, 2014, pp. 77-78). Secretary Baker publically presented these ideas in a speech to the Berlin Press Association on December 12, arguing that the three great institutions to Europe—NATO, the EC, and CSCE—should be adapted to provide the multilevel framework to absorb the coming changes. The slogan was a "new Atlanticism for a new era." (Kozyrev, 1995, s. 14). The existing Western institutions were expansive and integrative—allowing new members and new configurations of states. They were also institutions that reinforced multilateralism and restraint. In a period of rapid and dramatic power shifts—and the worries and opportunities that flowed from this transitional moment—those institutions proved most critical. Behind the diplomacy of German unification and European reorganization was a deeper saga of the American and Soviet negotiations that set the stage for the events in Germany and the end of the Cold War. The events leading to the September 1990 treaty that ratified the unification of Germany and transformed the relations across the Euro-Atlantic world cannot be understood outside of the larger context of American-Soviet diplomacy that ended the Cold War (Павлов, 2022, p. 356). The determination of Germany's military-political status was accompanied by a search for solutions to a whole range of purely military problems. In most of these measures, the Western negotiators accommodated Soviet wishes. However, with regard to the size of the armed forces of a united Germany, it was decided that it should be determined only at the Vienna talks, taking into account the establishment of corresponding ceilings for the armies of other European states. Of fundamental importance for finding solutions to the German settlement was the visit to the USSR in mid-July 1990 by G. Kohl and his talks with M.S. Gorbachev (Kozyrev, 1995, p. 159). This visit was preceded by three important summits of Western leaders in Dublin, London and Houston, which had a decisive influence on changing the USSR's position on the German question. At these meetings, the issues of providing large-scale economic assistance to the USSR and of providing it with security guarantees in the military-political sphere were resolved. On the evening of July 15, M.S. Gorbachev and G. Kohl arrived from Moscow to the highland village of Arkhyz in the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Region, where they continued their dialogue. They discussed in detail the external aspects of German unification, as well as the related problems of further development of bilateral relations. During the discussion of the external aspects of German unity, fundamental decisions were reached on the future military-political status of a united Germany, on the limits of the number of German armed forces, and the inadmissibility of the spread of NATO military structures to the territory of the GDR.

The results of the talks between M.S. Gorbachev and G. Kohl in Arkhyz drew a line under the months-long discussion about the place of the future Germany in the European military-bloc structures. The surrender of the Soviet positions was explained by the desire not to be forced out of Europe and to integrate into the system of European economic and political cooperation, as well as the expectation of being able to build privileged relations in the future with the new European giant - a united Germany (Oberdorfer, 1991, p. 125). On August 30, 1990 in Vienna, before the participants in the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRG G.D. Genscher, in full agreement with the Prime Minister of the GDR, made a statement according to which the government of the Federal Republic of Germany was obliged to reduce the armed forces of the united Germany within 3-4 years to 370 thousand people. This reduction was to begin from the moment the first treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe came into force. On September 12, 1990, in Moscow, the foreign ministers of the six states participating in the "2 + 4" negotiations signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (Воробьева, 2000, p. 248). The treaty for the first time unambiguously, in a form that excluded any possible interpretations, set forth the final nature of the external borders of a united Germany, which were defined within the framework of the FRG, the GDR and Berlin. It also contained a clear commitment not to have and not to make territorial claims against other states in the future. These commitments were reinforced by Germany's promise to remove from its constitution any provisions that contradicted them, and above all Article 23, which allowed for the possibility of extending the Basic Law of the FRG to "the remaining parts of Germany", which included the former German lands lost as a result of the Second World War. The consequence of the treaty was the complete renunciation by the FRG of its previous "legal position", which proceeded from the existence of the Reich within the borders of 1937. The most important component of the document was the agreements on military-political issues. The obligations of the governments of the FRG and the GDR that only peace would emanate from German soil, their renunciation of the production, possession and disposal of weapons of mass destruction were solemnly confirmed. The treaty provided for a reduction in the number of armed forces of the united Germany to 370 thousand people within 3-4 years (the treaty included an agreed statement made by the GDR and the FRG on August 30 in Vienna). The treaty determined that the Soviet Union and the united Germany would regulate the conditions and duration of the presence of Soviet troops on East German territory, as well as the conditions for their withdrawal by the end of 1994. As for the military-political status of the former territory of the GDR it was established that until the withdrawal of Soviet (later Russian) troops from there, only German territorial defense formations not integrated into NATO would be stationed on East German soil (Ахтамзян, 2010, p. 254). Thus, Germany, having reunited, contributed significantly to the security of both Germany and Europe by supporting the eastward expansion of the EU and NATO as a leading power in the EU in the 1990s.

Conclusion

Summarizing the historical role of the foreign policy aspects of the German unity: the granting of full sovereignty to a united Germany, participation in military blocs and the final recognition of its borders were resolved in the negotiation process according to the "4+2" (actually "2+4") formula. FRG and GDR plus four winners). With the adoption of the treaty of final settlement in relation to Germany, the application of the rights and duties of the four states was suspended. Germany, having reunified, strengthened its place in the European and Transatlantic security system. Thus, after reunification, Germany, under the leadership of Helmut Kohl, made great contributions to both the further development of the EU and security issues within NATO. These contributions were mainly due to the fact that, as the leading power of the EU, Germany supported both the deepening of integration processes in the EU and the expansion of the EU and NATO to the East, expanding its security zone to the East, and significantly contributing to the security of Germany and Euro-Atlantic.

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THE MISSION OF CONSTANTINE PATRIKIOS TO THE KARTVELIAN KINGDOM – DIPLOMATIC SCANDAL AROUND ARTANUJI FORTRESS

Lali Mekerishvili*

ABSTRACT

The position of Byzantium in Transcaucasia was not always the same. From the 10th century onwards, as the Caliphate's influence declined, the Byzantine Imperial Court sought to reinforce its authority in the region. Byzantium had a little power on the political entities of Eastern Georgia. However, the Byzantine influence was very strong in the Kartvelian Kingdom (southeastern Georgian realm).

The policy of the Byzantine imperial court was consistently oriented toward the objective of maintaining influence and strengthening positions on a particular political entity based on the internal political turmoil. This policy was clearly demonstrated when the Byzantines occupied the fortress of Artanuji. During this period, there was a divergence of views between the members of the Bagrationi royal family. This was exemplified by a disagreement between Gurgen IV the Great and his father-in-law, Ashot IV Kiskas. Ashot IV Kiskas was the instigator of an initiative, which resulted in the Byzantines taking possession of the fortress of Artanuji. According to the accounts of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Artanuji was a significant trading hub and he refers to it as "the key to Iberia (Kartvelian Kingdom – L. M.), Abkhazia and the Meskhetian country". Therefore, based on the importance of Artanuji, the Byzantine Emperor Romanos I Lekapenos (919-944) sent the Byzantine army with his representative – Constantine Patrikios. The Byzantines were able to capture the fortress of Artanuji, the citadel of the city, which caused a strong reaction. As a result, other representatives of the Bagrationi dynasty united against them. Gurgen IV and David II sent a threatening letter to the Byzantine Emperor. It is noteworthy that in their letter, the Bagrationi urged the Emperor to leave Artanuji fortress, otherwise they chose to side with the Caliphate, which was so alarming for the Emperor that he preferred to blame his representative Constantine as the author of this arbitrary action. If we observe the political processes in the Byzantine Empire and Kartvelian Kingdom, it should probably have happened in 923-924.

Keywords: Transcaucasia, Kartvelian Kingdom, Artanuji, Diplomacy, Byzantium, Arab Caliphate

INTRODUCTION

The term "Byzantine Commonwealth" was first introduced by the Russian Byzantinologist D. Obolensky. This term refers to the cultural-political unity created around Byzantium in a vassal state with the Byzantine Empire (Obolensky, 1971, p. 69). The aforementioned unity was predicated upon the recognition of the Emperor's supreme authority throughout the Christian world. The Georgian state unions, including the Kartvelian Kingdom, were included in the aforementioned Commonwealth. It is of interest to ascertain the form of the Kartvelian Kingdom's membership in this commonwealth and the nature of the relationship between the imperial court of Byzantium and the Bagrationi royal family of the Kartvelian Kingdom. In light of the hermeneutic study of the source, we will present the information that has been preserved regarding the relationship between the Bagrations and the Byzantine Imperial Court, as described by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus. By employing the historical-genetic method, we can illustrate the evolution of the historical event, the factors that influenced the Byzantine emperor's policies towards the Bagrations, and what kind of relationship was between members of the Bagrationi royal family. Furthermore, we will examine the consequences of the diplomatic mission organized under Constantine Patrikios. To discuss the mentioned issue, we can follow the political processes that occurred during the first half of the 10th century.

At the beginning of the 10th century, against the background of the powerful policy of the Arab Caliphate, the Byzantine Empire tried to strengthen its position in the Caucasus. During the reign of

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Romanos I Lekapenos (r. 920-944), the Byzantines sought to seize control of the fortress of Keje belonging to the Bagrations, as the capture of this fortress would provide a strategic advantage for the return of Theodosiopolis (modern Erzurum). There is considerable debate among historians regarding the location of the Keje fortress, most of them consider it to be the Fortress of Kaji (Papaskiri, 2016, p. 231). However, the Bagrations did not relinquish control of the Keje fortress to the Byzantines and advised the Emperor that only his own official could be appointed to oversee the fortress (Porphyrogenitus, 1952, pp. 265-266). Despite the Byzantines' efforts to capture the fortress of Keje, their attempt was unsuccessful, and the independence of the Bagrationi dynasty was even more evident in the diplomatic scandal around the fortress of Artanuji.

The Byzantine Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (r. 913-959), who is known in the history of Byzantine writing as the author of several original and compilation works, provides particularly interesting information in this regard. Of particular note to us is his historical work "De administrando imperio" in which Constantine addresses his son, Romanos, and informs him about all the peoples and states that surround the Byzantine Empire. In the mentioned work, a separate chapter is devoted to the story of the genealogy of the Iberians and the scandal around the fortress of Artanuji. The author used diplomatic documents while creating the work, at the same time, he used written essays and oral transmissions of those who knew the local people's lives. Of course, the subordinates would be involved in the creation of the works, but everything was personally arranged and formed by the author into one whole work. The primary objective of Constantine was to furnish his son with data regarding relations with neighboring communities. The introduction of the work commences with an appeal to the son (Kaukchishvili (1952): 220).

In the mentioned source, Constantine tells us in great detail about the diplomatic relations between the Byzantine Imperial Court and the royal family of Bagrationi. Before embarking on a discussion of the section that is of particular interest to us, it is necessary to provide an overview of the main center, namely Artanuji Fortress.

1. Artanuji Fortress

According to the Georgian source, the foundation of the city of Artanuji is connected with the name of Ashot I Kouropalates:

"The same Ashot' kuropalates discovered a rock in the forests of K'larjeti, where Vakht'ang Gorgasali had erected the fortress of Art'anuji and "the Deaf from Baghdad" had destroyed it. Ashot' restored and rebuilt that fortress and raised a city below the fortress. Ashot' built the church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul inside the fortress, prepared his own sepulcher and settled down in that fortress. Shortly thereafter Ashot' seized the lands up to the gate of the city of Bardav. And many times God granted Ashot' kuropalates victory and great glory in battles" ("The Life and Tale of the Bagrat'ionis," 2014, p. 214).

Constantine identifies the significant fortress and town of Artanuji as a hub for trade, noting the influx of various trade goods from diverse regions:

"The city of Ardanoutzin (Artanuji – L. M.) is very strongly defended, and has moreover a considerable suburban area like a provincial city, and the commerce of Trapezun and of Iberia (Kartvelian Kingdom – L. M.) and of Abasgia and from the whole country of Armenia and Syria comes to it, and it has an enormous customs revenue from this commerce. The country of the city of Ardanoutzin (Artanuji – L. M.), the "Arzyn", is both extensive and fertile, and it is a key of Iberia (Kartvelian Kingdom – L. M.) and Abasgia and of the Mischians" (Constantine Porphyrogenitus, 1967, p. 217).

It can be reasonably assumed that the fort's strategic location was the main reason for its promotion. Vakhtang Gorgasali highlighted the fort's advantageous geographical position and its strategic political context. The restoration and promotion of Artanuji, which was overthrown by Marwan the Deaf, were done with the same motives. Artanuji was located at the crossroads of important trade routes. This route connected Tbilisi with the cities of Byzantium, and thus it was of considerable strategic importance. The city of Artanuji constituted a key link in the network of routes connecting the eastern and western coasts of the Black Sea, and the eastern and western regions of Georgia. All of the aforementioned factors contributed to the city's prosperity. By the middle of the 10th century, it had already become one of the most important cities in Georgia. (Lortkipanidze & Papaskiri, 1998, p. 193).

It is conceivable that Artanuji needed suitable buildings to carry out economic relations; thus, the city was expected to have a reasonable number of commercial establishments, hotel buildings, as well as a large amount of customs duties from imported goods. This should have been one of the main sources of income for the city. It is not excluded that the sale of own products took place in the city. The extortion of merchants from foreign companies is a good market for Artanuji, which indicates the high economic level of the country. Artanuji must have been the first important point where Byzantine imported goods were introduced (Chilashvili, 1970, p. 109).

2. The Situation in the Kartvelian Kingdom Before the Diplomatic Scandal Around the Fortress of Artanuji

During this narration, also Sumbat David's son gives us quite accurate information about Bagrationi royal family, who was Erismtavari, Magistoros, Kourapalates, and he gives us exactly the years of birth or death of Bagrations, separates the opposing parties, and while describing all this, he separates two branches of Bagrations, starting from Ashot the Great Kourapalates, one of them was kings from Klarjeti, who were also "*Artanujelni*" (Owners of Artanuji fortress), and the second main branch was kings from Tao (Javakhishvili, 2012, pp. 109-110).

In the Kartvelian Kingdom, the fortress of Artanuji was initially owned by Gurgen eristavi of eristavis from the branch of Klarjeti. According to Constantine, Gurgen died without leaving any children, and thus the ownership of Artanuji passed to his brother Ashot IV, who was known as Kiskas (Constantine Porphyrogenitus, 1967, p. 215). Ashot IV is a familiar person in the History of Kartli (Kartlis Tskhovreba), the chronicler provides information about his death, although the name "Kiskas" mentioned by Constantine Porphyrogenitus is unknown. Kiskas is used in old Georgian as a definition of fast; it is conceivable that the mentioned name could also be based on Ashot's personal nature. If we take into account that there are often similar nicknames in the Kartvelian Kingdom, for example, Ashot "Kekela", and the term "Kekela" means beautiful.

The source indicates that Ashot IV Kiskas did not have a son, but rather a daughter who was married to Gurgen Magistros, a representative of a neighboring branch. Their relationship was characterized by a certain degree of tension. This is evidenced by the information recorded by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, which indicates that the son-in-law seized control of the fortress of Artanuji from his father-in-law and subsequently granted him Tirokastron and the land adjacent to the Ajara water, which bordered Koloria, as compensation (Porphyrogenitus, 1952, p. 276).

It seems reasonable to propose that Tirokastron should be considered the Greek translation of the Georgian term Kvelistsikhe (which had significant strategic importance due to its location on the border of Shavsheti, Adjara and Javakheti) (Constantine Porphyrogenitus, 1952, p. 276). However, Gurgen also took this territory after he had a confrontation with the King of Abkhazians and Ashot Kiskas chose the opposite position of his son-in-law. In the work of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Gurgen is presented as a usurper who owns his father-in-law's property, while Ashot is presented as the legal owner of Artanuji fortress. Gurgen, who held the title of great eristavi of eristavis, received this title from his uncle, Ashot "Kukh", who did not have a son. The Georgian chronicler also places a corresponding emphasis on Gurgen eristavi

of eristavis. He notes that he demonstrated the greatest courage, endured the most battles against the fathers and conquered the surrounding territories:

"Gurgen the Great eristavi of eristavis, son of Adarnase, died in 161 of the koronik'oni (941 A.D.), on 14 February. He showed more valor in battles than his ancestors, bringing all neighboring lands under his sway. And he had no offspring" (Jones, 2014, p. 216)

Information about Gurgen's active politics is preserved in the work "History of Armenia" by Yovhannes Drasxanakertc'i, an Armenian chronicler working in the 9th-10th centuries. From 918, the year in which Gurgen's ascension commenced, he was a prominent figure during the conflict that raged around the Alvan region of Uti. Subsequently, he also confronted Adarnase the king of Kartvelian Kingdom and the Armenian king in the battle for the Uti district (Abdaladze, 1988, p. 155). It is possible to hypothesise that the union of Adarnase and the Armenian king was a result of a strengthening of Gurgen. He engaged in active conflict with the Armenian king Ashot Erkat for Kvemo Kartli, particularly with regard to Samshvildi. The high authority of Gurgen is indicated by the mention of him as a king by Masud, an Arab chronicler of the 10th century (Lortkipanidze, 1988, p. 197).

3. The Diplomatic Mission of Constantine Patrikios in the Kartvelian Kingdom

Before discussing the controversy surrounding the fortress of Artanuji, Constantine Porphyrogenetus provides a historical overview of the Bagrationi royal family, including their kinship ties and interdependence within the family. The text provides the reader with an overview of the significance of the fortress of Artanuji, including its history and the individuals who have held it. It then goes on to describe in detail the diplomatic journey of Constantine Patrikios.

In accordance with the order of Romanos I Lekapenos, Constantine Patrikios and Drungar of sailing were sent to elevate Gurgen eristavi of eristavis to the rank of Magistros. In light of his active policy, it is plausible that Gurgen initially demanded the title of Kouropalates, rather than Magistros, from the Byzantine Emperor (Tavadze, 2016, p. 75). This is also evidenced by the fact that the mission of Constantine Patrikios in the Georgian kingdom ends in 923-924, and Sumbat David's son Adarnase dates the death of the Georgian king to 923, which means that Constantine's mission ends after the death of Adarnase and the title of Kouropalates is vacant. Gurgen was the most attractive option for the mentioned title. In accordance with a prevailing perspective within the field of historiography, the conferral of the Kouropalates was a manifestation of benevolence and acknowledgment on the part of the Byzantine Emperor. Those who held the aforementioned title were the most influential figures in the Kartvelian Kingdom (Tavadze, 2016, p. 76).

Upon his arrival in Nicomedia, he was approached by the nun Agapi of Kimene (a monastic centre in Bithynia, on Mount Kimene). Having prayed in the holy city, she proceeded to Iberia and met Ashot Kiskas in the fortress of Artanuji. In his account of the meeting between Ashot Kiskas and the nun, Constantine Porphyrogenitus makes it clear that there was a history of conflict between Ashot and Gurgen. Consequently, Ashot sought the nun's assistance and handed over the fortress of Artanuji to the Emperor, requesting that he extend his power over the fortress. *"I adjure you, by God and by the power of the honourable and life-giving Cross, to go to Constantinople and tell the emperor to send and take over my city, and have it beneath his dominion"* (Porphyrogenitus, 1967, p. 217).

The nun proceeded to inform the Emperor of the entirety of the situation in question, who, in turn, promptly issued a decree that Constantine should immediately relinquish all his affairs and embark on a journey to Ashot Kiskas and he was to assume control of the aforementioned fortress.

"Our holy emperor commands that you leave all you are engaged upon and go in haste to the patrician Asotios, called Kiskasis, and take over his city of Ardanoutzin, since he has declared to our holy emperor, by the mouth of the monk Agapios, that a trustworthy and familiar servant should be sent to take some capable officers, whom

you know to be brave and trustworthy, and enter and take possession of the city" (Constantine Porphyrogenitus (1967): 219).

In the aforementioned passage, it is evident that Ashot Kiskas was acknowledged as the genuine proprietor of the fortress. Nevertheless, at the same time, Gurgen was already in control of the Artanuji fortress, or would soon be. Otherwise, it is unlikely that Ashot would have surrendered the castle in his possession to the Byzantines. Ashot's objective is evident: he sought to utilise the Byzantines against his own son-in-law. He was prepared to accept the Emperor's authority over the fortress of Artanuji rather than remain under Gurgen's control.

Upon the entry of Constantine Patrikios and his three hundred men into Iberia, the subsequent developments diverged from those that had transpired previously. He was captured by David, the son of Adarnase Kouropalates, and was subsequently asked by the latter which task of the Emperor he should fulfill with such a large army at his disposal. It is noteworthy that Adarnase Kouropalates had recently passed away, thereby creating a vacancy of the title of Kouropalates. David the son of Adarnase was made to think and fear by the mentioned circumstance that he gave Gurgen the title of Kouropalates. Furthermore, the children of Adarnase engaged in a dispute with their own cousin following their father's demise. However, Constantine elucidated that his sole objective was to bestow upon Gurgen the title of Magistros. Constantine Patrikios proceeded to present the gifts sent by the Emperor to David. He then proceeded to Gurgen, where he bestowed upon him the title and prepared to take the fortress of Artanuji (Porphyrogenitus, 1952, pp. 282-283).

In accordance with the terms of the agreement, Constantine Patrikios met with Ashot Kiskas. Constantine Patrikios presented the Emperor's flag to Ashot Kiskas, who in turn flew it over the fortress. This action led to the conclusion that Artanuji was a gift from Ashot Kiskas to the Emperor. Constantine Patrikios submitted two reports to the Emperor. The first of them related to the story of the granting of the title Magistros to Gurgen, in which the praise of Gurgen was emphasized, while the second report contained information about the capture of the fortress of Artanuji and the dispute between Ashot and Gurgen, so Constantine requested the sending of an auxiliary army to defend the fortress (Porphyrogenitus, 1952, pp. 284-285). The policy of the Byzantine Empire is interesting; they maintain good diplomatic relations with the representatives of both branches of the Bagrations. On the one hand, Constantine Patrikios gave Gurgen the title of Magistros, spoke positively about him, and on the other hand, Byzantines took action against him and established control over Artanuji.

Upon learning of the Byzantines' intentions to strengthen their position, Gurgen Magistros and David Magistros sent a letter to the Emperor, declaring their intention to prevent any further incursions by the Byzantines and if they did not withdraw the army, they would leave their vassalage and choose the side of the Arabs.

"If your imperial majesty approves this and enters our country, then we put off our servitude to imperial majesty and make common cause with the Saracens, since we shall have fighting and hostilities with the Romans and shall, perforce, move an army against the city of Ardanoutzin and its country, and against Romania itself" ("The Life and Tale of the Bagrat'ionis," 2014, p. 214).

The loss of such a strong ally and the weakening of influence in the Caucasus was a wake-up call for the Emperor, so he revoked his decree regarding the capture of the fortress of Artanuji and presented it all as an arbitrary and independent decision of Constantine. The decision made by the Emperor was due to the fact that royal family of Bagrationi were appeased. For more persuasiveness, a threatening order was sent separately to Constantine to leave the fortress immediately, bring Ashot, the son of the deceased Adarnase, with him, so that the honor of his father as Kouropalates could be transferred to his son (Porphyrogenitus, 1952, p. 287). The Emperor chose a rather cautious diplomacy in dealing with the royal family. Constantine immediately left the fortress and entered the country of Gurgen Magistros and David Magistros.

The Bagrations separately focused on the unusual behavior of Constantine, how he quietly tried to take the fortress of Artanuji against the Emperor's will, and he did all this only at the request of Ashot Kiskas. Constantine Porphyrogenitus does not write anything about the exact answer that Constantine Patrikios gave to the Bagrations, only that he returned a suitable answer and only then brought the son of the deceased Adarnase the Kourapalates to be given the title by the Emperor. When narrating the mentioned episode, it is interesting to focus on the issue of the relationship between the royal family of Bagrationi. On the one hand, in the beginning it was Ashot Kiskas who used the power of the Byzantines against his own son-in-law, and on the other hand, when there was already a real danger that the Byzantines could take possession of the main fortress, they united against the Emperor at a critical moment and pushed the Byzantines back.

Thus, despite the obvious political weight of the Magistros title, its transfer could not be a compensation for the transfer of either the strategically important fortress-city of Artanuji or any other land to the Byzantine Emperor. The rulers of the Byzantine Empire in many cases gave these Byzantine courtier titles more importance than they had in reality, thus trying to satisfy both the ambitions of foreign rulers and the desire of the local Byzantine elite to gain superiority at the imperial court (Tavadze, 2016, p. 76).

CONCLUSION

Thus, the relationship between the Georgian kings and the Byzantine Emperors was not uniform and fluctuated in accordance with the prevailing circumstances. The Emperor's rights in Georgia were consistently upheld and he was never granted the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Kartvelian Kingdom. However, it was often the policy of the Byzantine Emperors to bring down envy among the Bagrations by granting titles. This was very well shown during the scandal around the fortress of Artanuji. As Ivane Javakhishvili points out, "the right of the emperor in Georgia has never gone beyond simple patronage and influence. He did not have the right to interfere in domestic affairs of the kingdom" (Javakhishvili, 2012, p. 108).

At the same time, there was a complicated political situation in the Byzantine Empire during this period. In 913-927 there was a war between Byzantium and Bulgaria. King Simeon of Bulgaria aimed not only to capture Constantinople, but also to conquer the entire Byzantine Empire. The Bulgarians again defeated the Byzantines at Katasyrtai in 917, Pegae in 921 and Constantinople in 922. After that, the creation of a possible alliance between the Bulgarians and the Arabs was a kind of threat for Romanos, because Simeon needed a fleet to take Constantinople. Simeon was aware that he required naval support in order to conquer Constantinople. Consequently, in 922, he dispatched emissaries to the Fatimid caliph Ubayd Allah al-Mahdi Bilah at Mahdia with a view to negotiating the assistance of a powerful Arab navy. The caliph consented to dispatch his own representatives to Bulgaria with the objective of negotiating an alliance. However, his ambassadors were apprehended by the Byzantines off the Calabrian coast on route to their destination. Emperor Romanos I Lekapenos managed to avoid the Bulgarian-Arab alliance with generous gifts from the Arabs (Runciman, 1969, pp. 84-100). Therefore, the loss of an ally in the Caucasus and its destruction on the side of the Arab Caliphate would be really unacceptable for the Byzantine Emperor. In addition, it is evident that the empire was incapable of extending its territory to the east (Nakada, 2014, pp. 40-41).

Regarding the fact that the Bagrations were recognized as sovereign rulers, it is also confirmed that Constantine, the Byzantine ambassador to the Georgian kingdom, holds the position of "Patrikios" with a high official rank. Sending such a high-ranking representative should indicate the complete independence of the leaders of Tao-Klarjeti (Lortkipanidze & Papaskiri, 1998, p. 201)

With regard to the matter of dating, Ivane Javakhishvili places the capture of Artanuji fortress by the Byzantines at 923-924 (Javakhishvili, 2012, p. 112). The basis for this is Constantine Porphyrogenitus's reference to the fact that at the time of the Artanuji incident, Ashot Bagrationi had not yet received the Kourapalates and the sons of the deceased Adarnase still had a dispute with their cousin Gurgen for the title.

Ashot's arrival in Constantinople and the conferring of the title takes place right after Constantine Patrikios leaves the fortress of Artanuji.

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THE CONCEPT OF MULTILATERALISM IN CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Luka Jintcharadze*

ABSTRACT

For decades, Canada's foreign policy has been defined by a steadfast commitment to multilateralism, rooted in its historical engagement with key international institutions, including the United Nations, NATO, and the Group of Seven (G7). This article critically examines Canada's multilateral approach to international security, with a specific focus on its involvement in the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Canada actively supported the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, contributing military forces, diplomatic efforts, and humanitarian aid under the UN mandate as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This engagement reinforced Canada's dedication to collective security and humanitarian intervention within a multilateral framework. Simultaneously, Canada's refusal to participate in the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq further exemplified its commitment to multilateralism and adherence to international legitimacy as conferred by the UN.

Keywords: Canada, foreign policy, multilateralism, Afghanistan, Iraq, NATO, United Nations.

INTRODUCTION

Canada is perceived in various ways in the global context. From a North American perspective, it is often viewed as a reliable ally of the United States, exemplified by its participation in initiatives such as the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). At the same time, Canada is portrayed as a neighbor driven by economic interests, particularly in disputes over trade policies, natural resources, and market access. This dual perception reflects the complexity of Canada's foreign relations, as the country seeks to balance strategic cooperation with economic self-interest in an increasingly globalized environment. (JAMES et al., 2006, p. 16)

In the field of international diplomacy, Canada is widely recognized as a committed advocate of multilateralism. As a foreign policy approach, multilateralism involves cooperation among states through negotiations and agreements and stands in contrast to bilateral cooperation. Notably, some of the most significant academic work on multilateralism, peacebuilding, and related topics has originated in Canadian academic institutions. (Jentelson, 2015, p. 684). **This article puts forward the hypothesis that Canada's foreign policy reflects a consistent commitment to multilateralism, even though the form of its implementation has varied depending on different political leaders and global contexts.** The article aims to support this thesis by analyzing two key episodes — Canada's involvement in the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns — which clearly illustrate the country's stance on multilateral engagement, international legitimacy, and global security.

Canada's active participation in shaping and supporting multilateral institutions in the post-World War II era solidified multilateralism as a cornerstone of its foreign policy thinking and practice. (Keating, 2013)

1. Methodological Basis

This article employs a qualitative, case-study-based historical analysis to explore Canada's commitment to multilateralism in foreign policy. The methodological approach integrates three core elements:

1.1. Historical-Comparative Method. The study traces the evolution of Canada's multilateral engagement from the post-World War II period to the early 21st century. By comparing different governments (e.g., those of Lester B. Pearson, Pierre Trudeau, Jean Chrétien, Stephen Harper, and Justin Trudeau), the article evaluates how multilateralism has been maintained, adapted, or challenged across changing political and geopolitical contexts.

1.2. Case Study Analysis. Two key case studies — Canada's participation in the Afghanistan campaign (2001–2021) and its non-participation in the Iraq War (2003) — serve as focal points. These cases are

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selected for their significance in illustrating Canada's foreign policy choices under pressure from global events and alliance politics. The Afghanistan case exemplifies engagement through multilateral institutions like NATO and the UN, while the Iraq case highlights Canada's prioritization of international legitimacy over bilateral alliance obligations.

1.3. Document and Discourse Analysis. The article relies on primary sources such as speeches by Canadian leaders, policy statements, government records, and official UN and NATO communications. These are supplemented by secondary scholarly sources that provide analytical interpretations of Canada's foreign policy traditions, decisions, and debates. Particular attention is paid to public statements and parliamentary debates during key moments of decision-making (e.g., Chrétien's 2003 UN speech, Harper's positions on Libya and Crimea, Trudeau's post-2015 positioning).

This multi-method approach allows for a nuanced understanding of the continuity and shifts in Canadian foreign policy, especially regarding the principles, practices, and political rhetoric surrounding multilateralism.

2. Theoretical Framework

This article is grounded in the theoretical tradition of **Liberal Institutionalism**, which posits that international cooperation through institutions can mitigate anarchy in the global system and foster collective security. This perspective provides an analytical lens through which to understand Canada's long-standing commitment to multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, NATO, and the G7. According to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, institutional arrangements can constrain state behavior, reduce transaction costs, and enhance transparency — all of which are evident in Canada's preference for multilateral frameworks in matters of security and diplomacy.

In addition, the article draws on insights from **Constructivist theory**, particularly in analyzing how Canada's national identity as a peacekeeping and rules-based state has shaped its foreign policy decisions. This is especially relevant in cases such as Canada's refusal to participate in the 2003 Iraq War, where normative considerations and domestic perceptions of legitimacy outweighed alliance pressures. Constructivist approaches allow for a nuanced understanding of how foreign policy is influenced not only by material interests but also by ideational factors such as values, identity, and historical narratives.

3. The main part of the article

It is important to acknowledge that, in Canada, multilateralism has been subject to critical scrutiny from various political and theoretical perspectives in recent decades. This is particularly evident in the context of international economic relations, as exemplified by Canada's decision to pursue a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States in 1984. (Maxwell & Tomlin, 2000).

Critics of multilateralism have increasingly directed their scrutiny toward international institutions, particularly the United Nations, highlighting their perceived failures in the post-World War II era, particularly in the realm of international security. This critique has been further fueled by discussions surrounding Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's decision to refrain from participating in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Opponents argue that Chrétien's government prioritized an unwavering commitment to multilateralism, often at the expense of Canada's national interests and values. (James et al., 2006, p. 355).

Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper shared the skepticism of multilateralism voiced by many of Jean Chrétien's critics. Under Harper's leadership, the government's focus was primarily on Arctic sovereignty, and he frequently criticized Chrétien's administration for adopting a foreign policy that was considered more assertive than what had traditionally been aligned with Canadian values.

The debate surrounding Canadian multilateralism was prominently featured at a December 2009 conference at Dalhousie University, which brought together scholars and policymakers to mark the centennial of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The discussions primarily centered on the evolution of Canadian multilateralism across various sectors. These deliberations culminated in a special issue of a scholarly journal, which published a series of academic articles. A significant number of contributors advocated for a more nuanced approach, one that seeks to recalibrate past commitments in order to align with and advance contemporary government priorities

while addressing continental, regional, and global dynamics. Several authors emphasized that effective multilateralism is essential for fostering a closer and more productive relationship with the United States, a stance also endorsed by Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

The Second World War marked the foundation of Canada's tradition of multilateralism. In the aftermath of the war, Canada emerged as a global power with a robust economy, the third-largest navy, and the fourth-largest air force, moving away from the quasi-isolationism that characterized its pre-war stance. In 1947, Canadian Foreign Minister Louis St. Laurent asserted: "We now have an opportunity to demonstrate a high degree of competence, readiness, responsibility, and purpose in the conduct of our international affairs." This statement underscored Canada's commitment to a more active and engaged role in global diplomacy. (St. Laurent Louis, 1947). In the aftermath of the crisis, Canada, along with other nations, played a pivotal role in constructing a more prosperous and secure world, grounded in multilateral institutions and shared norms. This commitment to collective action and adherence to common rules became a cornerstone of Canada's foreign policy in the post-war era.

Canadian politicians became active "architects" of a new rules-based international order in the post-war era. For instance, Canada played a significant role in the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, which led to the establishment of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Similarly, Canada was deeply involved in the development of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)¹, in which the original 23 signatories committed to reducing trade barriers among themselves. Canada was also a founding member of the United Nations, having successfully advocated for the inclusion of socio-economic objectives in the organization's charter during the 1945 San Francisco Conference.

However, as the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union began to undermine the collective security role of the UN, Canadian diplomats strongly supported the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a counterbalance. While the British Commonwealth was not a new institution, it remained a key element in Canada's post-war foreign policy. Notably, Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson, during Prime Minister St. Laurent's tenure, played a crucial role in transforming the Commonwealth into a multiracial organization and successfully brokering a compromise that allowed newly independent India to join as a republic.

Following 1945, multilateralism solidified Canada's position as a valued member of the global political community, particularly within the Western bloc. In response to the United Nations' call for assistance during the Korean War, Canada contributed significantly to the military effort. Ottawa also deployed an infantry brigade and an airborne division to Western Europe to support NATO in defending against the Soviet threat. A key moment in Canada's multilateral engagement came with Prime Minister Lester Pearson's instrumental role in de-escalating the Suez Crisis of 1956. For his efforts, the Nobel Committee lauded Pearson for "saving the world," and he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. While Pearson's primary goal was to resolve the divisions within NATO and the broader military community caused by the British and French invasion of Egypt, prompted by the nationalization of the Suez Canal, he faced criticism from some quarters for not supporting the former colonial power, Britain. Despite this, his peacekeeping initiatives at the United Nations garnered widespread support within Canada, both at the time and in the years that followed.

Canada's commitment to peacekeeping became one of its most prominent international roles in an era marked by regional conflicts. From the 1956 Suez Crisis until the end of the 20th century, Canada deployed peacekeeping forces to over thirty conflict zones. Notably, Canadian troops served as a buffer between opposing pro-Greek and pro-Turkish factions in Cyprus for an extended period. Additionally, in 1954, Canada was invited to join the International Supervision and Control Commission (ISCC), tasked with monitoring the ceasefire agreement and overseeing elections in divided and war-torn Vietnam. Given the growing U.S. military presence in South Vietnam, Canada, as the Western representative on the commission, found itself aligning more closely with U.S. interests in the region. (Scott W. See, 2011, p. 193)

The victory of the Progressive Conservative Party in the 1957 Canadian election did not fundamentally alter the core principles of post-war Canadian foreign policy. As one foreign diplomat

¹ GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

noted, "Canadians are almost pathologically aware of Mr. Pearson's shadow and are largely content to continue the policies of the previous government" (Brendan Kelly, (2019)). When the United Nations Secretary-General called for the deployment of peacekeepers to the Congo, Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker faced significant pressure from the Canadian public, many of whom viewed peacekeeping as integral to the nation's identity. Diefenbaker played a key role in preserving the multiracial character of the peacekeeping institution, and notably, he was the only white leader to publicly oppose apartheid, thus distancing himself from the readmission of South Africa at the 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.

The following year, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker galvanized the Commonwealth in opposition to Britain's potential departure from the European Economic Community. Diefenbaker, Canada's 18th Prime Minister, was frequently characterized as a "Cold Warrior" who believed that Western alliances, particularly those led by the United States, often necessitated controversial commitments, such as Canada's involvement in nuclear weapons programs, driven by the defense of North America and NATO. Diefenbaker's outspoken remarks and his hesitation on certain key issues frustrated Canada's allies, contributing to the eventual decline of his political leadership and his departure from government.

When the Liberals returned to power in 1963, many Canadians expected Prime Minister Lester Pearson to elevate Canada's international profile. However, by this time, Canada's role on the global stage had undergone significant shifts. The economic recovery of Western Europe and Japan, coupled with the admission of numerous new countries to the United Nations, had diminished Canada's influence. Additionally, the post-World War II consensus that had defined Canadian foreign policy began to unravel in response to the U.S. war in Vietnam and NATO's increasing reliance on nuclear weapons in the 1960s—an issue Pearson had reluctantly accepted. "Quiet diplomacy," long seen as a hallmark of Canadian multilateralism, began to take on a pejorative connotation, with critics calling for a more "independent" foreign policy stance.

Despite these challenges, Canadian multilateralism remained productive during this period. For instance, during the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus, where sectarian violence posed a threat to NATO allies and risked escalating tensions between Greece and Turkey, Canada played a crucial role in supporting both NATO and the United Nations, the latter of which was mired in prolonged debates over mission authorization and funding. Pearson also brokered a significant compromise within the Commonwealth regarding the unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), then a British colony ruled by a white minority during Africa's decolonization. Canadian diplomats within NATO, who had long opposed the organization's sole focus on military objectives, worked to shift NATO's priorities. This effort culminated in the 1967 Harmel Report, which recommended that NATO broaden its focus to include peacekeeping operations, as well as prepare for potential intervention against the Soviet bloc and reinforce the organization's defense capabilities. (NATO's Harmel Report, (1966/67)

Canada and the United States established more favorable relations following the less productive years of the Diefenbaker-Kennedy era. In 1965, the two countries signed the Auto Pact, an agreement that reduced tariffs on automobiles, trucks, and their components. This accord had a profound impact on trade, as the automotive industry became the largest sector of bilateral commerce. Factories on both sides of the border began to rely on parts manufactured in the other country, thus facilitating the integration of the North American automotive production system. (Scott W. See, 2011, p. 194)

Another indication of the successful cooperation through multilateralism emerged in the landmark 1965 report, *Principles of Partnership*. Authored by Canadian diplomat Arnold Heaney and his American counterpart Livingston Merchant, the report emphasized the shared values between the two countries, asserting that their goal was to strengthen peaceful and mutually beneficial economic and diplomatic relations. While, in hindsight, the *Principles of Partnership* may appear overly optimistic, they captured the strong desire of both nations in the mid-1960s to avoid conflict and foster a cooperative relationship. (Scott W. See, 2011, p. 194)

In 1968, Canada's 15th Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, vowed to reassess the country's foreign policy, critiquing Canada's unquestioning adherence to NATO and arguing that the nation harbored an unrealistic vision of its international role. Regarding peacekeeping, Trudeau asserted that Canada should

not act as the "world's policeman." He contended that "foreign policy" should be better understood as a reflection of national interests, leading him to reduce the number of Canadian NATO forces stationed in Europe by half. In contrast, former Prime Minister Lester Pearson maintained that true national interest encompassed "cooperation with others to create a world order that would promote freedom, prosperity, and security for all," underscoring a more multilateral approach to international relations. (Bothwell, 1998, p. 88).

At this point in history, Canada appeared to retreat from a more active role in multilateralism. In fact, the Trudeau government was neither particularly inclined toward nor capable of pursuing a robust multilateral agenda. His 16 years in power were characterized more by continuity than by a shift in foreign policy direction. However, during this period, Canada remained engaged in key multilateral efforts, participating in all United Nations peacekeeping missions and contributing to significant international negotiations. Notably, Canadian diplomats played an active role in the 1970s in discussions such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. In 1976, Canada's admission to the newly formed Group of Six major industrialized countries marked a notable step in its international engagement. Following this, the group expanded to the Group of Seven (G7), where Trudeau became an active participant at the summits. (James et al., 2006, p. 297).

In 1984, when Brian Mulroney became Canada's 18th Prime Minister, his Progressive Conservative government pledged to establish a "special relationship" with the United States. Mulroney's most significant international achievement was the 1989 Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement, which solidified the economic ties between the two countries. His government continued Canada's postwar foreign policy tradition of fostering a close relationship with the United States. Additionally, Mulroney took a firm stance on global issues, advocating for economic sanctions against apartheid South Africa at both the United Nations and the G7. Canada also became a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and eventually joined the Organization of American States (OAS). A notable diplomatic achievement during this period was the successful compromise between Ottawa and Quebec on the contentious issue of provincial participation in the Francophonie, which paved the way for the first annual summit of the international organization.

Following the end of the Cold War, Canada capitalized on its "peace dividend" by withdrawing its troops from Europe, a move that is often considered to have diminished its influence within NATO. However, Canada reluctantly joined the UN military coalition led by the United States in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Some Canadians expressed concerns that participating in "muscular multilateralism," such as the military actions authorized by the UN Security Council during the Gulf War, might undermine Canada's long-standing reputation in peacekeeping. Nonetheless, the Mulroney government remained active in supporting UN peacekeeping missions in conflict zones like Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Mulroney also took a keen interest in the UN's initiatives on environmental protection and child welfare.

In the early 1990's, during an era of expanding trade liberalization, the incoming Liberal government under Jean Chrétien ratified the previously negotiated North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and joined the newly established World Trade Organization (WTO), which succeeded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Chrétien's government also honored Canada's peacekeeping commitments in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. However, it became apparent that maintaining peace in such regions was far more complex than anticipated. Traditional peacekeeping strategies, which typically involve establishing buffers between conflicting parties, proved difficult to implement in politically unstable countries.

Canada has cultivated close alliances with like-minded states and civil society groups, leading to significant achievements such as the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty and the establishment of the International Criminal Court (Nossal, 1999, p. 103). However, the country also played a notable role in the bombing of Serbian forces in Kosovo, mobilizing a small military force under the banner of human security.

The US response to the September 11, 2001, attacks posed new challenges to Canadian multilateralism. In alignment with other NATO allies, Canada participated in the US-led invasion of Afghanistan to topple the Taliban government. However, in the broader "war on terror," the

administration of George W. Bush shifted its focus toward the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the invasion of Iraq, citing the alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)² in Iraq—a claim that was later unsubstantiated.

The Chrétien government contended that Canadian involvement in the Iraq War would require multilateral support through the United Nations. Canadian diplomats argued that more time was needed for weapons inspectors to verify the presence of suspected WMD. Despite these concerns, the issue of invading Iraq was decided when the United States, the United Kingdom, and the "coalition of the willing" chose to bypass the UN and proceed unilaterally.

The Chrétien government's decision to refrain from participating in the Iraq War became one of its most popular and significant foreign policy moves, particularly among Canadians. This stance reinforced Canada's commitment to multilateralism at a time when there was growing apprehension regarding the influence of the United States on global affairs.

Canada's 22nd Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, deployed Canadian troops to Kandahar province in Afghanistan as part of NATO's mission. Under Harper's leadership, Canada's approach to multilateralism became notably selective. The government extended Canada's military mission in Afghanistan under NATO until 2014, participated in NATO's air campaign against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and joined its allies in the fight against the Islamic State. Harper's administration also took a firm stance against Russia's annexation of Crimea, condemning the act on the global stage.

Harper's strong focus on global economic governance and international trade—issues that gained increasing significance following the Great Recession of 2008—led to Canada's active participation in multilateral forums such as the G8, especially after Russia's expulsion from the G7. This period marked a shift toward prioritizing economic and security interests in Canada's foreign policy while engaging selectively in multilateral initiatives.

In contrast, the Harper government exhibited a deep skepticism toward the United Nations. Canada's failure to secure a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2010 was a clear manifestation of this skepticism (Brendan, 2022, p. 4). Similarly, in other major multilateral institutions such as the Commonwealth and the Francophonie, the Harper government was not hesitant to boycott meetings or publicly criticize member states that, in his view, did not align with Canada's commitment to freedom, democracy, and human rights. While the Harper government received praise for its boldness, critics contended that its "megaphone diplomacy" undermined constructive engagement with other nations, potentially alienating allies and hindering diplomatic progress.

In the 2015 Canadian election, the Liberal Party's victory marked a shift in Canada's foreign policy under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who proclaimed that Canada was "back" on the world stage. Whether Canada had ever truly left the global political stage remains a matter of debate and historical perspective. Nevertheless, Trudeau's rhetoric strongly reaffirmed Canada's commitment to a multilateral system that, although under strain, remained central to its foreign policy approach. His administration suggested that while the multilateral system faced challenges and required reform, it remained the most effective framework for addressing global issues. In this context, Canada's leaders and policymakers can take pride in the country's ongoing commitment to multilateralism, a tradition that has evolved over the past 75 years and continues to shape Canada's role in the twenty-first century.

CONCLUSION

Canadian foreign policy has consistently adhered to the tradition of multilateralism for over seven decades. Although there have been periods in history when the Canadian government sought to distance itself from this approach, as evidenced by the policies of the 15th Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, in 1968, the overarching commitment to multilateralism has remained a cornerstone of Canada's international relations. Trudeau, in his promise to reassess Canada's foreign policy, criticized the country's alignment with NATO and expressed concerns about Canada's unrealistic foreign policy vision. On the issue of peacekeeping, he famously stated that Canada was not the "world's policeman."

²WMD - Weapon of mass destruction

It appeared, at this point in history, that Canada sought to avoid further entanglement in multilateral initiatives. Nevertheless, despite this rhetoric, the Trudeau government continued Canada's involvement in global peacekeeping efforts, including participation in international negotiations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea during the 1970s. These actions underscored the enduring influence of multilateralism in Canadian foreign policy, even during periods of retrenchment.

A clear demonstration of Canada's commitment to multilateralism came in 2003, when Prime Minister Jean Chrétien decisively rejected the United States' call for military intervention in Iraq. This stance was emblematic of Canada's dedication to multilateralism, prioritizing international consensus over aligning with a neighboring superpower. The Canadian participation in the 2001 Afghan campaign, in contrast, was part of a multinational coalition, with Canada playing a significant role in Afghanistan's reconstruction, reinforcing Canada's position as a contributor to collective security and peacebuilding.

In August 2021, under the leadership of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Canada withdrew its troops from Afghanistan following the Taliban's resurgence. While Trudeau had initially sought to withdraw earlier, he deferred this decision until the global coalition had completed its departure. This move, while aligned with the broader international withdrawal, also highlighted Canada's independent decision-making, reinforcing its sovereignty in foreign policy decisions. Despite fluctuations in approach, Canada's longstanding commitment to multilateralism continues to shape its foreign policy trajectory in the twenty-first century.

These two case studies—Afghanistan and Iraq—demonstrate the practical and principled dimensions of Canadian multilateralism: an active participant in UN- or NATO-backed missions and a cautious skeptic of unilateral interventions that lack multilateral legitimacy. Canada's multilateralism has undergone significant transformation—from the idealism of postwar peacekeeping to a more pragmatic and interest-based approach in the 21st century. Nonetheless, the foundational commitment to working through international institutions has remained a defining feature. This enduring commitment to multilateralism also reflects Canada's self-perception as a "middle power" committed to a rules-based international order. This identity, constructed over decades of diplomacy, continues to guide its behavior in global affairs. Domestic political pressures and public opinion have also played a role in shaping Canada's multilateral approach. The widespread opposition to the Iraq War at home contributed to Chrétien's refusal to engage, aligning democratic accountability with multilateral norms. As global power dynamics shift and multilateral institutions face increasing strain, Canada's challenge will be to adapt its multilateral engagement to new realities—reconciling national interests with global responsibilities in a more fragmented world order. Ultimately, Canadian foreign policy reflects a balancing act between normative commitments to multilateralism and the strategic imperatives of an evolving global landscape—highlighting the country's unique role as a cautious yet committed actor in international affairs.

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TOPONYM OF KEPAZ (HARAK) MOUNTAIN IN AZERBAIJANI POETRY**Zekiyey Abilova*****ABSTRACT:**

Azerbaijan, every inch of which is a history and chronicle, has always attracted attention not only as an important strategic region, but also for its rich nature, abundant blessings and mysterious beauty. From this point of view, Kapaz mountain from the Murovdagh range is one of the settlements that includes the features listed above. In this article, referring to the sources of Azerbaijan literature and historical facts, a number of interesting points related to Kapaz have been touched upon. Thus, in the article, based on the works of Azerbaijan poets such as Samad Vurghun, Sa`daddin Barda`i, Nizami Ganjavi, as well as the historical facts of scholars such as Zakariyya al-Qazvini, Abdur-Rashid Bakuvi, a number of toponomies related to this region were investigated. Manuscripts are a major factor in the results obtained. The evidence from the sources once again proves that the ancient name of Kapaz is Harak. Harak is also the name of the castle built on this mountain. This article talks about the name of Kepaz mountain as Harak in a number of medieval sources.

Keywords: Kapaz, Harak, Azerbaijani, poetry, Zakariyya al-Qazvini, Ganja, Khosrow va Shirin

INTRODUCTION

The role of manuscripts as an important source in researching and uncovering historical facts and cultural monuments is undeniable. From this point of view, the Institute of Manuscripts named after Muhammad Fuzuli of ANAS is an invaluable treasure rich with primary sources that talk about various fields of science. Referring to the manuscripts in the treasury, especially the works of Samad Vurghun, Nizami Ganjavi and Sa`daddin Bardai, interesting toponomic facts related to the mysterious nature of the Kapaz (Harak) plateau, as well as a number of tribes that lived in this region in the Middle Ages, were interpreted. The opinions of scholars such as Zakariyya al-Qazvini and Abdur-Rashid Bakuvi, who were also investigated by academician Ziya Bunyadov long ago, are very important in finding further confirmation of those facts.

1. THE MAIN PART OF THE ARTICLE

In the sources, it is noted that the word Kapaz is of Turkish origin and means "rock" or "rock by the water", "mountain with a hollow, stepped, rocky mountain" (Qeybullayev, 2022). Kapaz is not just an Azerbaijan toponomy. To clarify, it is not an ordinary mountain that restores the balance of the earth. This mountain is a geographical point symbolized in the same harmony with the history of Azerbaijan as it moves from era to era, century to century. As a result of the terrible Ganja earthquake that occurred on September 30, 1139, large pieces of rock broke off from the mountain and blocked the path of the Aghsu river and as a result, several lakes were formed. One of such lakes is Lake Goygol, whose beauty is beyond words. XX century Azerbaijan poet Samad Vurghun writes in his poem "Azerbaijan":

مین قزاخدا کو هلن آتا

یالمانینا یاتا-یاتا

آت قان ترە باتا-باتا

گوگ یابلاقلار باشینا فالخ

کیاز چاغچان گوگ گولی باخ!

Get on a playful horse,

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Hugging its neck
 While the horse is sweating
 Climb up the blue plains
 Look at the Lake Goygol from Kapaz (Vurğun 1935).

Describing the fascinating nature of Azerbaijan, Samad Vurghun particularly highlights the uniqueness of the Kapaz plateau and the mysterious Goygol, which relaxes the human soul when viewed from here. The description of Kapaz, which has always been a plateau and a place of rest for surrounding settlements, has been reflected in the works of Azerbaijan poets from time to time. It is known from history that Kapaz from the Murovdagh range is remembered more for its inaccessible peaks. One of the poems dedicated to the praise of Kapaz belongs to Sa`daddin Barda`i, a famous linguist of the 15th century Azerbaijan. Sa`daddin S`adullah Barda`i was born in the city of Barda, one of the cultural centers of medieval Azerbaijan. He lived at the beginning of the 15th century. Besides being the author of a number of works on Arabic linguistics, he also wrote poems (3.93)

The scientist's work "Hadaigud-dagaig" dedicated to linguistics is widely spread. Dozens of manuscript copies of the work are preserved at the Institute of Manuscripts named after Muhammad Fuzuli of ANAS. The "Catalogue of old printed books", which provides information about the old printed copy of the work, notes that the book printed in Simferopol in 1905 is about linguistics and consists of 281 pages (4.101). Sa`daddin Bardai's five-couplet poem dedicated to the Kapaz plateau is a complete chronicle of the medieval history of that region. Although the poem is written in Arabic, its title is in Azerbaijani as مدح البيلاق سمى كپز (Praise of the plateau called Kapaz) and occupies folio 84b of manuscript coded B-5696 (Barda`I, p. 84). The cover is cardboard with greenish paper. It was copied with black ink. It was copied out with Rugi handwriting with shikasta sign. The paper is bluish in color, relatively thick, watermarked, made in Europe. The first beyt of the five-couplet poem reads:

ان في المصطاف ماء باردات
 كافبات شافيات صافبات

In al-Mastaf the water is (ice) cold.
 It is effective, healing, pure.

"Al-Mastaf" refers to Kapaz plain. No other place is mentioned in the poem. There is enough ice-cold water here that is effective for cultivation, healing for health and unpolluted, so pure that there is no danger in direct use.

انهاسلو انتبلشرية
 مرويatalوارداتالصاديات

It (they) brings calm like sweet syrup,
 It makes the irrigated lands fertile.

These pure and sweet waters are an invaluable asset both for household needs and in farm work. As is known, a large number of rivers flow from Kapaz mountain, such as Karachai, Buzlugchai, Sarichai or Todan etc. Their total number is fifteen.

It is written in the third beyt:

بقة منخولة بل خيرت
 يرتضيها مالك لمشيات

(The land) is suitable for cultivation,
 Stockbreeders will be satisfied here.

Like the abundant, life-giving water of the plateau, the soil is also fertile and productive. Arable land produces good crops. It is also useful for animal husbandry. Its wide pastures and cool waters are a rich source of food for herds of animals in the hot summer months. Shepherds who feed their animals here are satisfied with the conditions.

The fourth beyt of the poem reads as follows:

بيد انها في التواحي طانقا

گرجیات سارقات رازیات

But there are tribes in the regions (around),
Georgians, sarigs, razis.

The poet also writes that a number of tribes settled in the vicinity of this place, which is suitable for living and recreation. He mentions the name of the Georgians, then writes "Sarigat". In Arabic, the root "saraga" means "to steal". It can be assumed that after the earthquake of 1139, as a result of the death of countless people, the property left in Ganja (Janza) was looted by the king of Georgia, Dometer and his army. It is likely that the gates of Ganja would have been looted at that time. However, if we look at history, we will see that in the second millennium of our era, Basil, Onogur, Hun, Tuba, Avar, Khazar, Bozal, Scythian, Sok, Bulgar, Bun, Suvar ethnic groups became a serious force in the South-West Caucasus. In the 5th century, the Onogurs, Saragurs, Ogurs, Kufrigurs and others from the Bun-Bulgar tribes moved to the southern Caucasus - Georgia and Azerbaijan (Kazimov, 2014, p. 13). Proceeding from this, it can be said that the poem mentions the existence of Saragurs and Rasayat tribes along with Georgians. Otherwise, the translation of the verse would be: "Georgians, thefts, misfortunes". However, it is known from the content of the poem that the poet is listing the tribes.

It is written in the last, fifth beyt of the poem:

لزگیات طامعات طاوقات
هوزیات بوزیات فاریات

Lezgis, Tami's, Tavi's,
Huzes, grays, blacks.

We could not get information from the sources about "Tami's" and "Tavigurs". There is a wealth of information about the tribes in the second verse. Mohammad Moin, explaining the term "huz", notes that this tribe, which is called "Huzaye" in Syriac, is the name of a tribe living in Khuzistan province, which is located in the southwest of Iran (Mo`in, 1999, p. 1121). In order to protect the northern borders of the Sasanian Empire (226-651), they were moved to the northeastern part of Azerbaijan. Geybullayev states that the toponyms of Lahij in Ismayilli district and Khizi in Absheron valley originated from the names of Lahijan and Khuzistan in Iran. It is likely that their relocation to this region coincided with the reign of Khosrow Anushiravan (531-579). These are the Tats who speak the new Persian dialect (Гейбуллаев, 1986, p. 107). Abdur-Rashid Bakuvi, while giving information about Azerbaijan, states that it was a very large settlement and was located between Kuhistan, Arran and Arman (al-Bakuwi, 1971, p. 61). Arman is ancient Urartu, which was always under the rule of the Turks after it was invaded by the Medes (Aliyev, 2019)

As for "bozes", Mahmud Kashgari interprets this expression only as a color and writes that if an animal is in the color between white and red, it is called: "Boz koy", i.e. "grey sheep" (Kashghari, 2006, p. 131). The word "boz" in "Tarama dictionary" means "unplowed soil", "water that obstructs the vision in the eye" (Tarama sözlüğü, 1963, p. 657). On the page where the poem is copied, the comments and translations given on individual words in the verses are also translated as color. It is noted that the expression "al-bozi" in Persian means "between black and white" in Turkish. In "Muntakhabati-lughati-Osmaniyya" the meaning of the word "boz" is interpreted somewhat broadly and it is noted that "very frisky and fast horse" is also called "boz". It also carries the meanings of "clever vizier" and "man with a strong memory" (Muntakhabati-lughati-Osmaniyya, 1298, p. 121). The name of one of the 12th century Persian judges was Boz-oba or Boz-aba. Eldaniz (Atabey) comes to his help when the governor of Ray joins Abbas and wants to overthrow Sultan Masud. Abbas was killed in 1146 and Boz-oba a year later (Yıldız, 1989, p. 82). However, since the poem is about tribes, when we expand the research a bit and turn to other sources, we see that Geybullayev considers "buzal" or "bozal" to be among the Khazar tribes. The name of the Khazars, one of the Turkic-speaking peoples of Eastern Europe, meant "mountain tribe" (Weekes, 1990, p. 406). Geybullayev notes that the name of the village of Bozalganli in Tovuz region is derived from the root "buzal" and connects geographical names such as Bozaleti, Buzala, Bozaleani in

Georgia with the migration of 2000 Khazarian families to that region in the 9th century (Гейбуллаев, 1986, p. 46). Since the latter information is more appropriate, it is confirmed that the poem refers to the "bozes" from the Khazarian tribes.

The name of the last tribe in the poem, the original expression "garayat" is undoubtedly the adjective "gara" (black). The Persian-Russian dictionary, which explains the toponymy of "Gare", notes that there is a village with such a name near Medina, inhabited by tribes with a good shooting culture (Рубинчик, 1970, p. 1159). In the "Tarama dictionary" it is stated that the word "black" also has meanings such as "black people", "defect" (Tarama sözlüğü, 1963, p. 2252). Ibn al-Asir, while reporting on the horrors of the 1139 earthquake in his work "Kamil fit-tarikh", notes that the greatest horrors of the earthquake that occurred in the provinces of Azerbaijan and Arran in that year were manifested in Ganja. Every side was ruined. Losses were incalculable. It is said that 230,000 people died. Among them, the two sons of the country's governor, Black Sungar, also died in that earthquake. Murahidaddin Bahruz's castle there was blown up and a large amount of stock and property in the castle was destroyed (18.77). If we take into account that there were dozens of tribes living in the mountains at that time and each tribe had its own ruler and its own language that was not similar to others, naturally one of them is the tribe ruled by Black Sungar. This idea is confirmed by the "Great History of Islam". The source identifies one more branch of Turkish governors and commanders, such as Amir Gumushtekin Jandar, Amir Atabay Kara Sungur, Atabay Imadaddin Zangi, Atabay Eldeniz and Atabay Zahiraddin Tughtekin, who played an important role in the history of the Great Seljuks and attributes them to the Khazars. He notes that in Azerbaijan, this ethnonym is reflected in the name of the "Garajurlu" tribe. The name of "Gara Chopo" in Kyrgyzstan and "Karachor" province in Western Siberia (XVII century) was taken from here (Yıldız, 1989, p. 46). The geographical name "Garachop" on the territory of Georgia can also be attributed here. Thus, by reviewing Sa`daddin Bardai's five-beyt poem, we managed to uncover a number of topographical facts related to the mysterious nature of the Kapaz plateau with its fertile soil, abundant water and wide pastures. Such facts are useful for the study of the history of Azerbaijan, in addition to revealing the ethnic composition of the country at different historical stages.

The theme of Kapaz is also reflected in the creation of the genius Nizami, whom Azerbaijan gave to the world. Y. Bertels, who studied Middle Ages classical poets of the East, paid special attention to the genius Nizami (Бертельс, 1962, p. 221). The poet wrote about the Ganja earthquake, which he witnessed in his poems "Treasure of Secrets", "Khosrov and Shirin" and "Iqbalnameh", which is directly related to Mount Kapaz:

He saw an earthquake, which shook the sky,
Cities were destroyed and sunk into the ground.
When the mountains and rocks are shaken and fly away,
Destiny was covered in dust in an instant.

It was as if the earth and sky were turned upside down (Ganjavi, 1982, p. 427).

The city (Ganjavi. 1982. p. 663) whose name appears in classical texts as Canza was destroyed. Nizami excitedly describes this terrible scene, which resulted in the disintegration of Mount Kapaz and the creation of a number of lakes.

Bertels, who gave a philological analysis of the poem "Khosrov and Shirin", tells Khosrov in the language of Shahrukh that a powerful woman named Samira, known as Mahin Banu, rules on the shores of the Caspian Sea and in the mountains. She spends the summer in the Arman mountains (Wrongly in Russian it is given Arman as Armenia. As mentioned above, Arman was a Turkic state), she migrates to the Mughan plain in the spring, hunts in Abkhazia in the fall and spends the winter in her capital Barda (Бертельс, 1962, p. 221). That story is given as follows on page 39 b of the manuscript (Ganjavi, B-1200):

به فصل گل به موقعان است جایش
که تا سرسبز باشد خاک پای

به تابستان شود بر کوه ارمن
خرامد گل به گل خرمن به خرمن
به هنگام خزان آید به ابخار
کند در جستن نخیر پرواز
زمستانش به بردع میل چیر است
که بردع را هوای گرمسیر است

*The lush green Mughan in the blooming season becomes her bed,
During the summer, her place is Arman land.
From planting to planting, flower to flower
When summer is over, when autumn is coming
She hunts in Abkhazia.
Barda's weather is so perfect,
She comes here every year in winter (22.63).*

Nizami, who is a master of beautiful landscapes, skillfully describes the Kapaz mountain. In the description of Inhirag, later named Kapaz, he writes:

ز جرم کوه تا میدان بغرا
کشیده خط گل طغرا بطغرا
در آن محراب کو رکن عراق است
کمربند ستون انحراف است.

From the mountains of Chorrum to the desert of Bughra,
Everywhere was covered in spring flowers,
It can be a shrine to Irak
Alone at the foot of beautiful Inhirak, (Ganjavi, B-1200).

Everywhere is green. It is as if an emerald-colored carpet has been laid on the floor. Whoever watches this beauty forgets his sorrow. These places are completely immersed in spring beauty. The beautiful Inhirak is a mihrab for Irak. Mirjalal Zaki, a prominent follower of Azerbaijan aruz studies and a valuable translator of Nizami's works, gives the verse in the translation of "Treasure of Secrets" as follows:

In Bughra square on Chirram mountain
Beautiful flowers have opened,
These are similar to the tugra of the king of the era
That mihrab (church) that supports Irak
Looks like a belt around Inhirak's waist (Ganjavi, 2018, p. 70).

The translator who gave the interpretation of the verse notes that Chirram is the name of a mountain in the Arman province. Bughra is the king of Kharazm and Bughra square also belonged to him in that area. The inscription with the first letters of the name and nickname of the king of the era on the orders of the kings is called Tughra. The translator who referred to Vahid Dastgirdi's critical text also touches on the wrong opinion of the Soviet orientalist Y. Marr. He reminds that according to Marr, "Irak" is a part of Armenia. Inhirak is currently known as "Inshirak" (Ganjavi, 2018, 70). Some researchers who benefited from Marr's wrong conclusion led to the falsification of the shades of the text and its Armenianization. Among other things, the website "Ganjur" - the Poets' Divan also repeated the same mistake:

ز جرم کوه تا میدان بغرا
کشیده خط گل طغرا به طغرا
در آن محراب کو رکن عراق است
کمربند ستون انحراف است

Here, the name of the mountain is given as "Inshirak". According to the information of "Moin", it is reported that the mountain with the same name exists in the territory of Armenia (Mo'in, 1999, p. 186). Apparently, Y. Marr also applied to "Moin" to confirm his opinion. This indicates the Armenianization of the text.

In the two examples mentioned earlier, the name of Kapaz mountain is given as انحراف (Inhirak). While reviewing six manuscript copies of Nizami Ganjavi's masnavi "Khosrov and Shirin" preserved at the Institute of Manuscripts named after Mahammad Fuzuli, we came across different images of the verse mentioned above. So, although the beyt is given in copy D-349, the name of the mountain is not written (Ganjavi, D-349, 393). The M-156 coded copy does not contain that beyt at all (Ganjavi, M-156, 82b). An exquisitely designed, gold-encrusted M-323 cypher copy, copied out in black ink, with nastalik handwriting. The cranberry-colored leather covered cardboard binding is decorated with gold medallions. In the beyt mentioned in the text copied in the 15th century, the name of the mountain is given as الخراق (al-Kharak) (Ganjavi, M-323: 34 b). The verse mentioned in ciphertext M-325 reads as follows:

کمربند بیستون انحراف است (Ganjavi, M-325, 84 a)

Apparently, with the copyist adding "bi" to the beginning of the word "column". another meaning has been acquired. We did not come across this image in any of the other manuscripts and printed copies we examined.

The name of the mountain is given as الخراق (al-Kharak) in the coded copy M-266, copied in the 19th century, on a thick cardboard covered with golden water, with drawings of flowers, birds and butterflies on a black background, with grid drawings on the edges (Ganjavi, M-266, 38 a).

Thus, one of the six reviewed copies did not give the beyt at all, while the other one did give the beyt, but the name of the mountain was not given, in two it was given as الخراق (al-Kharak), in one as انحراف (Inhirak) and in another as انحراف.

Nizami Ganjavi's creativity is a deep ocean that scholars have spent their lives studying. In this field, many studies have been conducted in our southern neighbor, Iran. In this regard, Vahid Dastgardi and Behruz Sarvatian also contributed. When we refer to the beyt mentioned above in the copies worked by both scholars, we found it in the following way. Vahid Dastgardi (Ganjavi, n.d.).

ز خرم کوه تا میدان بغرا
کشیده خط گل طغرا بطغرا
در آن محراب کو رکن عراق است
کمربند ستون انحراف است.

Behruz Sarvatiyan (Ganjavi, n.d.).

ز خرم کوه تا میدان بغرا
کشیده خط گل طغرا بطغرا
در آن محراب کاو رکن عراق است
کمربند ستون "الخراق" است.

As it can be seen, Vahid Dastgardi gave it as "انحراف" (Inhiraf) and Behruz Sarvatiyan gave it more differently as "الخراق" (Ganjavi, n.d.).

In the copy of the work translated by Hamid Mammadzadeh, edited by Tahir Mammadzadeh and Ahmadagha Ahmadov, the translation of the paragraph is given as follows:

From Mount Chirram to Bughra Square
Be Irak's pillar at that altar at the historical moment
Like a pillar (winding), like a belt to the Tower of Inhirak
There was a rock-hewn monastery (Ganjavi, 1962, p. 68).

In the copy translated jointly by Said Mirgasimov and Gulamhuseyn Behdili (Ganjavi, 1962, p. 44), as well as in the text translated into Uzbek by the Uzbek folk poet Jamal Kamal, the name of the mountain is given as "Inhirak" (Ganjavi, 2019). The beyt mentioned in the Russian version of "Khosrov and Shirin" published in the translation of G.Y.Aliyev and M.N.Osmanov is given as follows:

It can be considered part of the region of Irak
Which is located in the belt of the Anharak fortress (Гянджави, 1985. 65).

There are historical sources that prove that the investigated mountain is modern Kapaz. Let's consider a few such comments of Azerbaijan historians. Zakariyya al-Gazvini writes about Harak-Kapaz Mountain:

"The Harak fortress rises one pass from the city. There are fragrant herbs, abundant waters and gardens around it. In the summer the weather is very pleasant and the inhabitants of Janza move there. Every family has a house here and they stay here until the cools fall. Famous people of Janza have beautiful mansions here" (Бунятов, 1976, p. 52).

Another source writes:

"Janza is located on the Daruran river and takes its source from the mountain called Murov. It is a very tall mountain and there is always fog at the top. They say that everyone can see this mountain from the top of the castle. However, the castle is not visible from the top of the mountain" (Бунятов, 1976, p.53).

From here it is known that there was also a castle called Harak at the top of the mountain.

Each of the works addressed on the subject reminds that the events took place around Ganja. Abdur-Rashid Bakuvi (second half of the 14th century - the beginning of the 15th century) writes: "Ganja is one of the fortified cities of Arran. It is close to Georgian cities. (All kinds of) blessings and grain abound. The population is religious. The Kargakas River flows there. Six months of the year, it flows from the side of Georgian states. During the (remaining) six months of the year, it has no water. Its inhabitants have a culture of silkworm rearing and sericulture. One passage from the city stands Harak Castle, surrounded by fragrant herbs, waters and gardens. Since the weather is nice in summer, residents of Janza go there. At the top of the high mountains there is a plant called "hur" that looks like Syrian mulberry. It is an ointment for liver diseases. It cannot be found anywhere except Janza and Shirvan. The genius, knowledgeable and wise poet Abu Muhammad al-Nizami (Ganjavi) is from there (Bunyatov, 1971, p. 91; manuscript 56b-57 a). Another interesting thing in Bakuvi's notes is that he gives the expression Harak in the form هرک. As for the lexical meaning of the word "harak", it is also stated in the sources that it means "camel with two humps" in Turkic languages (Бунятов, 1976, p. 140). Apparently, Kapaz mountain had two peaks before the earthquake. It was torn apart by an earthquake.

CONCLUSION

Evidence from sources once again proves that the ancient name of Kapaz is Harak. Harak is also the name of the fortress built on this mountain. The reason why the word "harak" is given in different forms in different sources is that it was distorted by calligraphers, either unintentionally or intentionally, during copying. It seems that in the main version it was as الحرك. Since the definite article "ل" (lam) is not clear, it is sometimes read as "خ" likened sometimes as "ن" and the dot of "ح". Since "خ" and "ه", as well as "ك" and "ق" are letters of the Arabic alphabet that are close to each other in terms of pronunciation and at the same time, they are not words of Arabic origin, they are written as they are pronounced and as a result, various versions were obtained. All these differences are most likely scribal errors. In fact, the historical name of Mount Kapaz (al-Harak) is Harak and has always been located in the territory of Azerbaijan.

Nizami Ganjavi, today, who is recognized as a wise poet of the whole world, is from the ancient city of Azerbaijan, Janza-Ganja. It is commendable that on the occasion of Sheikh Nizami's 880th anniversary, on May 18, 2021, on the initiative of the Ganja City Youth and Sports Department, Nizami peak was conquered in the Kapaz mountain range and a plaque with the name of the poet was fixed at a height of 3080 meters. Finally, I would like to remind you that on August 16, 2021, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev mentioned the need to restore our historical geographical names in his speeches when he was in Lachin and Kalbajar regions. In this regard, it would be appropriate to restore our ancient toponyms mentioned in the article.

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